University of Nebraska at Omaha

DigitalCommons@UNO
Student Work
1-1-1966

Edward Cardwell and the reform of the British Army, 1868-1874
Dennis R. Dubs
University of Nebraska at Omaha

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/studentwork

Recommended Citation
Dubs, Dennis R., "Edward Cardwell and the reform of the British Army, 1868-1874" (1966). Student Work.
394.
https://digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/studentwork/394

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by
DigitalCommons@UNO. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Student Work by an authorized administrator
of DigitalCommons@UNO. For more information, please
contact unodigitalcommons@unomaha.edu.

EDWARD CARDWELL AND THE REFORM
OF THE,BRITISH ARMY, 1868-1874

A Thesis
Presented to the
Department of History
and the
Faculty of the College of Graduate Studies
University of Omaha

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts

by
Dennis R. Dubs
January 1966

UMI Number: EP73032

All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.

DIsswtMian: Publishing

UMI EP73032
Published by ProQuest LLC (2015). Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code

ProQuest
ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346

Accepted for the faculty of the College of Graduate
Studies of the University of Omaha, in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree Master of Arts.

C h a i r m a n D e p a r t m e n t !

Graduate Committee
Name

PREFACE

Although long interested in the dramatic aspects of
military history, I must admit that I had little interest in
the subject of military reform until the autumn of 1964.

In

a seminar conducted by Dr. A. Stanley Tri.ckett on the reform
movements in nineteenth century Britain, I became aware of
the military reforms which Edward Cardwell instituted in
the British Army during his secretaryship at the War Office
between 1868 and 1874.

After writing a seminar paper on

one aspect of the Cardwell reforms, I became deeply inter
ested in all the military reforms which he introduced.

This

thesis is the result of that interest.
Only one work, Robert Biddulph's Lord Cardwell at
the War Office, has been devoted to the full nature of these
reforms.

Written by Cardwell's personal secretary at the

War Office and published in 1904, this work provides a good
description of the Cardwell reforms, but due to Biddulph's
close relationship with Cardwell it lacks■a sense of
historical objectivity.

Then too, the date of publication

prevented the author from reaching any conclusions about the

impact of the Cardwell reforms on the British Army during
the period immediately preceeding the First World War.
In recent years Arvel B. Erickson has written a
biography of "Edward T. Cardwell:

Peelite," and has pub

lished it in the Transactions of the American Philosophical
Society, Vol. XLIX, Pt. 2,

(1959).

In this work, the first

biography of the life of Cardwell, Erickson recognizes that
•>
in the history of nineteenth century Britain Cardwell's
importance largely rests on his achievements as an Army
reformer.

Unlike Biddulph, however, Erickson limits his

evaluation of the Cardwell reforms by looking at them as
the apex of a political career which exhibited tremendous
talent for administrative duties.

While such a point of

view is undoubtedly true, it is nevertheless too narrow.
Recognizing the weaknesses of both Biddulph's work
and Erickson's biography,
Cardwell reforms.

I have sought to re-evaluate the

The task of preparing this thesis has not

been easy as the decisions involved in its organization and
composition were difficult and frustrating to say the least.
But decisions were made and conclusions were drawn,, and I
assume all responsibility for any shortcomings that may
have resulted.

Now that the task is finally finished I can

iv

truly understand what the poet Kahlil Gibran meant when he
wrote, "Your joy is your sorrow unmasked."
I wish to express my gratitude and appreciation to
Dr. A. Stanley Trickett for his aid and encouragement in
the preparation of this thesis.

Without his advice and

counsel this work might never have been completed.

I also

wish to thank the other members of the history faculty at
the University of Omaha as each one of them has been of
some help to me at one time or other during my graduate
career thus far.

Finally,

I wish to thank Miss Ella Jane

Dougherty for her help in locating books from libraries
all over the country through the facilities of inter-library
loan.

January 1966

Dennis R. Dubs.
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CHAPTER I
SETTING THE STAGE

Heavily burdened with immense military expenditures
during the Napoleonic Wars, Great Britain was determined
to reduce her large military establishment following
Napoleon's final defeat at Waterloo in 1815.1

In the interest

of national finance the Duke of Wellington recognized that a
general reduction of the military forces was imperative, but
he urged Parliament to refrain from embarking on a policy of
retrenchment that would destroy the regiments and battalions
which had served him so faithfully on the continent.

Fearful

of impairing Britain's fighting capability in the future,
military economists in Parliament heeded the Duke's advice
and applied much of their "scrapping and scraping" to the
supporting services of those combatant units. 2
possible, however,

It was not

to limit all the military reductions to

: l

Robert Biddulph, Lord Cardwell at the War Office
(London: John Murray, 1904), p. 38. Hereafter cited as
Biddulph.
r 2

George Arthur, From Wellington to Wave11 (London:
Hutchinson and Co., y\1942/f, P- 63. Hereafter cited as
Arthur.
1

2

transportation and supply sections as Britain's Army totaled
297,364 men in June 1814.

3

With little need of a large

military establishment in the post-war years, additional
reductions were authorized in the ranks of the combatant
units.

4

By 1821, only six years after Waterloo,

the British

Army was reduced to approximately 100,000 men of whom

50,000

were stationed at home, 30,000 were distributed in the various
colonies, and 20,000 were located in India.

5

With Napoleon removed from the European political
arena, no forseeable danger prevented Great Britain from
reducing her Army to this extent.

In need only of a small

force to preserve order at home and to maintain control of
her colonies abroad, Britain could afford to restore her
traditional reliance on the defensive protection which the
English Channel and the Royal Navy offered. 6

Surrounded

3
Great Britain, British Sessional Papers, House of
Commons, edited by Edgar L. Erickson, "Estimates of Regular
and Militia Forces,” IX (1814-1815), 321. Hereafter cited
as B. S_. P.
4

Arthur, p. 63.

5Eric William Sheppard, A Short History of the British
Army (4th ed.; London: Constable and Company, Ltd., 1950),
p. 206. Hereafter cited as Sheppard.
Peter Gibbs, The Battle of the Alma (Philadelphia:
J. B. Lippincott Company, 1963), p. 12. Hereafter cited
as Gibbs, Alma.

3

by water, the insular position of the British Isles
offered its inhabitants a sense of security which
Coleridge poetically described:
'Ocean, 'mid his uproar wild,
Speaks safety to his island child.’
To be sure, the British did not forget their Army
in the years which followed.

After 1821 it was periodically

increased in size until it reached approximately 140,000
men in 1854.

8

But m

spite of this increase in manpower,

which was mainly distributed in the colonial stations, a
corresponding concern was not given to the organizational
and administrative needs of an Army spread around the world.
With troops dispersed in small detachments throughout the.
Empire, no provision was made for a system of periodic
transfer during the enlistment period of twenty-one years.
Living in isolated out-of-the-way places,

the men became

less, concerned with military drill or other activities that,
would promote efficiency within their ranks.

Instead, they

7

Great Britain, 3 Hansard1s Parliamentary Debates,
CCXIV, 1078.
Hereafter cited as Hansard1s . Mr. W. Fowler,
M. P., quoting Coleridge.
1 8Sheppard, p. 207;
Ernest Llewellyn Woodward, The
Age of Reform, 1815-1870, Vol. 13 of The Oxford History of
England, ed. G. N. Clark (2nd ed., 14 vols.; Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1962), p. 271.
Hereafter cited as Woodward.

4

married into native populations,

settled on small farms to

raise chickens, and grew fat from lack of activity.9
By 1850, the British Army was composed of little
more than a confused hodge-podge of infantry battalions,
cavalry regiments, and artillery batteries.

The divisional

and corps organization of the Peninsular Wars no longer
existed.

Regular maneuvers were no longer held, trans

portation and supply sections were maintained only within
a skeleton framework, and officers had neither professional
skill nor attitude as commissions were obtained by the
system of purchase.^9
Much of this degeneration was attributable to the
state of dormancy which affected the organization and
administration of the Army after the Napoleonic Wars.^^
It seemed that Wellington and Waterloo had proven the worth
of the Army during its struggle with Napoleon; therefore, in
the years that followed few attempts were " . . .

made to

modify or improve the armament, equipment and methods . . . ."

12

When changes and adjustments were made, the modifications could
9
Arthur, pp. 63-64.

10Ibid-, p, 64.

^Gibbs', Alma, p. 15.

^Sheppard, p. 207.

5

best be described as piecemeal in character and patchwork
in nature which resulted in a "sorry-looking" and "loudlycreaking" machine.

13

The fact that the Army establishment became anti
quated was largely due to no fault but its o w n . ^

The cry

for reform went up time and again both in and out of
Parliament, but the Army high command continually turned
a deaf ear.

In 1837, for example, a Royal Commission,,

presided over by Lord Howick (later Earl Grey), made
numerous recommendations to the Army for correcting imper
fections within its organization and administration.
its prime suggestion,

As

the Royal Commission recommended that

the Secretary at War be made responsible for the entire
administration of the Army.

15

Since the Duke of Wellington

believed that military matters must be kept entirely
separate from politics, he vigorously opposed this recom
mendation and successfully led the fight against the
acceptance of the proposals given by the Royal Commission.^
11

Arthur, p. 64.

14

.
Owen Wheeler, The War Office Past and Present
(London: Methuen and Co., Ltd., 1914), pp. 149-150.
Hereafter cited as Wheeler.
.15
Arthur, p. 81.

16 , . n
Ibid.

6

Because Wellington personified the Army in its days of past
military glory,

17

much of the Army was left in the condition

which the Duke desired.

18

.After all, as Wellington put it,

there could be nothing drastically wrong with the Army
which had triumphed at Waterloo,

19

Not only did the Army high command oppose the reform
of its administration and organization, but it did little
to improve the circumstances of the common soldier.

By

any standard, life in the enlisted ranks of the Army left
much to be desired.

The men lived in crowded and unsanitary

barracks, existing on an improper diet, drinking impure
water, and wearing inadequate clothing. 20

As E. L. Woodward

■^Gibbs, Alma, p. 12.
18

"Against such changes— as the abolition of the
Master-General, and the consolidation of the War Department
under one Civil Head^-the Duke of Wellington, in official
intercourse, had solemnly warned the Ministry of Lord
Melbourne in 1838, and of Earl Russell in 1849.
They both
heeded his warnings', or in deference to his great experience
in War and Politics, abided by his advice." As stated in
Charles M. Clode, The Military Forces of the Crown; Their
Administration and Government (2 vols.; London: John Murray,
1869) II, 391. Hereafter cited as Clode.
■^Anthony Wood, Nineteenth Century Britain, 1815-1914
(London: Longmans, 1960), p. 193.
Hereafter cited as Wood.
20

Arvel B. Erickson, "Edward T. Cardwell:
Peelite,"
Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, XLIX,
Pt. 2 (1959), 68. Hereafter cited as Erickson.

7

states,

". . . urinal tubs, which stood in the rooms during

the night were emptied out in the morning and used for
washing.

..21

,

.

.

As a result of Such conditions,

the men were

easily susceptible to various diseases which attributed to
a death-rate among the home forces that was five times greater
than that of the civilian population.

Living conditions were

even worse overseas with the death-rates also much higher.
Under such circumstances discipline could be maintained
only through the use of severe punishments such as branding
and flogging in an effort to prevent stealing, brawling,
drunkenness, and desertion.
In retrospect,

22

it is difficult to comprehend why such

conditions were allowed to exist, especially when much of
Great Britain was actively engaged in social, political, and-'
economic reform.

In general,

three reasons can be cited for

this disgraceful state of affairs.

First of all, it was

impossible to persuade Parliament to appropriate the necessary
funds for financing reforms as the nation was involved in a
mania for economy after 1815; therefore, military questions
21

Woodward, p. 2 66, n. 2.

"^Erickson, p, 68; Woodward, p» 2 67.

gradually came to be considered in terms of economy alone.
Secondly, Army officers were adverse to improving the living
conditions of their troops just as they neglected to acquaint
themselves with the technical aspects of their profession.
i
Thirdly, the public recognized that reforms were needed but
remained indifferent as it was convinced that reforms would
be impossible to put into effect.

In addition,

the public

failed to improve the situation by utilizing the enlisted
ranks of the service as a means of "reforming" the problem
men of the day.

As a result, many good men often refrained

from "picking up the King's shilling," and the presence of
a large number of low caliber recruits was often used as an
excuse to justify the lack of reform. 2 3

Thus, a man who

was not a social outcast before enlisting in the Army soon
became one when he did.

24

With these attitudes permeating

the whole of British society mid-way in the nineteenth
century, conditions were hardly conducive to reform.

The

advent of war, however, would soon change this situation.
The opening of the Great Exhibition in London on
May 1, 1851, was hailed by many.Victorian leaders as the

^^Ibid.

^^Gibbs, Alma, p. 13.

9

beginning of a new era in international relations.

It was

hoped that in the future peaceful economic competition
would replace military struggle,as the means of settling
international differences. 2 5

With the outbreak of the

Crimean War in 1854, such a dream was short lived.
drab colonial skirmishes within the Empire,

Excluding

the British Army

had not participated in a war since the struggle with
Napoleon. 2 6

The Army, therefore, eagerly looked forward to

the Crimean War as an adventure in which it could re-capture
the "pools of military glory" in which it had bathed in
previous years.

With the excitement of a fox hunt the

British Army embarked for the Crimea,

27

but once in the

peninsula the Army discovered neither adventure nor glory;
it experienced a nightmare instead.
Psychologically,

the Crimean War was a shock to

the Army establishment as it brought home the realities of
25
John W. Dodds, The Age of Paradox: A Biography of
England, 1841-1851 (New York:
Rinehart and Company, Inc.,
1952), pp. 469-470.
26

W. H. Goodenough and J. C. Dalton, The Army Book
for the British Empire (London: Harrison and Sons, 1893),
p. 24. Hereafter cited as Army Book.
27

.
,
Cecil Woodham-Smith, The Reason Why (New York:
McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1954), p. 138. Hereafter
cited as Woodham-Smith.

Lord Bacon's proverbial addage, "'Let it suffice,

that no

estate expect to be great that is not awake upon any just
occasion of arming.'"

28

As the British Army stumbled into

the Crimea, confusion reigned supreme.

Combat revealed the

Army establishment to be almost totally unprepared for war;
military leadership was almost non-existent as most officers
were either inept or over-aged; and no clear-cut chain of
command existed.

29

The systems of supply were inadequate

and frequently broke down; the troops were often left
without adequate means for waging war*

30

Matters became

even more confusing when officers ignored the advice of
their intelligence reports and left the transportation of
troops to chance.

31

As casualties-and disease mounted,

deficiencies in the ranks became widespread as the supply
of reserve troops could not keep up with the demand.

32

The victims of this "system of mismanagement" were
the British soldiers, and the horrors they suffered are too
28

Statement by Lord Bacon as cited by "The Military
Forces of the Crown," Edinburgh Review, CXXXIII (January,
1871), 207. Hereafter cited as "Military Forces."
29
31

'
Erickson, p. 68.
Woodham-Smith, p. 136.

30
32

Arthur, p. 28.
Wheeler, p. 149.

11

well known to bear repetition.

33

But in spite of privation,

suffering, and death, the fighting quality of the British
troops compensated for almost every lack in their leadership.
As Peter Gibbs credits in his book The Battle of the Alma,
the British soldiers saved the day for their leaders who did
all but throw it away. 3 4
Responsibility for Britain's military ineptness cannot
t

be blamed on leadership alone as due credit must also be given
to the lack of an adequate administrative system.
prior to 1854,

Immediately

the business of the Army was managed by the

following eleven departments, all of which were independent
of each other and communicated by letter:

the Secretary of

State for War and the Colonies; the Home Secretary; the General
Commanding-in-Chief; the Secretary at War; the Ordnance Office;
the Treasury; the Army Medical Department; the Audit Office;
the Commissioners of Chelsea Hospital; the Board of General
Officers; and the Paymaster-General.

35

Dr. Andrew Smith,

^ F o r a complete description of the mismanaged
efforts of the British Army during the Crimean War see
Cecil Woodham-Smith, The Reason Why (New York: McGraw-Hill
Book Company, Inc., 1954).
34

Gibbs, Alma, p. 14.

•^Appendix A, p. 138.

12

Director-General of the Army and Ordnance Medical Department,
when asked by the Sebastopol Committee investigating the

conduct of the Crimean War who his superior was, replied,
**'The Commander-in^-Chief, the Secretary at War, the Minister
of War, the Master-General of Ordnance,
how many more.'"

and I hardly know

36

At the outbreak of the Crimean War it was recognized
that unity in the Army administrative arrangement was badly
needed.

Hastily, a scheme for amalgamating the various

departments was adopted, but this plan lacked defined
objectives for effecting.a purposeful amalgamation.
Accordingly, in June 1854, the War Office was separated
from the Colonial Office and placed under a newly created

Secretary of State — the Secretary of State for War.

37

In

December, the Commissariat Department was transferred from
the Treasury to the War Office.
the next year,

38

Early in February of

the office of the Secretary at War was

36
Great Britain, Parliament Papers, "Report of the
Select Committee on the Army Before Sebastopol," IX (1885),
Pt. 1, 392, as cited by Erickson, p. 68, n. 6.
37

Biddulph, p. 9; Erickson, p. 69. Hereafter, when
referring to the Secretary of State for War the shortened
title of Secretary of War will be used.
38

Appendix A, p. 139.

combined with the duties of the Secretary of War.

39

In

March, the control of the Militia, Yeomanry, and Volunteers,
was removed from the Home Office and given to an Inspector
of Militia, who was made directly responsible to the
Secretary of War.

Shortly thereafter,

the Secretary of War

assumed responsibility for the Army Medical Department and
the Army clothing establishment.

40

By 1856, the Secretary of War, having under his
control all the civil administrative offices of the Army,
was head of the whole administration of the Army at the
War Office.

The only Army department which was not located

in the War Office at Pall Mall was the office of the General

Commanding-in-Chief whose office was located at the Horse
Guards.

When the Secretary of War transferred the command

and discipline of the Royal Artillery and the Royal Engineers
to the General Commanding-in-Chief in May 1855, the General
Commanding-in-Chief became the administrator of all the combatant branches of the Army.

41

Technically, however,

the

39

Woodward, p. 292, n. 1. The office of Secretary
at War continued to remain part of the duties of the
Secretary of War until 1863, when it was finally abolished.
40

Erickson, p. 69;

"Military Forces," CXXXIII,

212-213.
41

Biddulph, pp. vi-vn,

9.

14

General Commanding-in-Chief was subject to the civil
authority of the Secretary of War, but since his office
W&s physically separated from the War Office and communicated
'with it by letter, the office of the General Commanding-inChief was considered a distinct department.

42

Thus, the immediate effect of the Crimean War was a
revamping of the Army administrative system from numerous
independent and mutually conflicting offices to two such
offices— the Secretary of War,

responsible for the civil

administration of the Army, and the General Commanding-inChief, responsible for the military command and discipline

of the fighting forces.

43

At first glance,

it would appear that such sweeping

reforms in the Army administrative system would have removed
from the War Office much of its inefficiency, mismanagement,
and lack of organization.

Perhaps this might have been the

ease had the War Office been reconstructed under a clearly

devised system.

As it was, various departments were thrown

43Wheeler, pp. 175-176; Biddulph, p. 10.
43Sheppard, pp. 216-217.

Hereafter when referring

to the General Commanding-in-Chief, the title Which was
Erickson,
adopted in 1887 will be used— Commander-in-Chief,

p. 67, n. 1.

together under one head without having been properly
combined.

44

At the end of the Crimean War the reconstructed

USLi Office consisted of part of the Colonial Office, part
Of the Ordnance Office, all of the Secretary at War's Office,
$Nirt of the Treasury, and part of the Home Office.

45

Conse

quently, duties were duplicated and further inefficiency
resulted.

Sir Robert Biddulph described this reconstruction

ifI one word— catastrophe.^
Administrative reform, however, was not the only
lesson which the Crimean War had taught.
the recent experience of mismanagement,

On.the plea of
suffering, and

privation in the Crimea, the public urged that greater
concern be given to the common soldier as a tribute to his
efforts during the war.

As a result, the Victoria Cross

for bravery was instituted in 1856, and it was open to all
ranks.

47

Military hospitals were built at Netley and

Hoolwich, and a medical school was established in 1859

for the study and treatment of wounds and diseases. 48
44

45
47

"Military Forces," CXXXIII, 213.
Biddulph, p. vi.
Woodward, p. 2 92.

46
48

Ibid.
Wood, pp. 203-204.

16

Likewise,

sums were appropriated for the construction of
.

*6*ding rooms, gymnasia,

and other recreational facilities.

49

With the defects of the British military system
Clearly revealed in the Crimean experience and 'to a
lesser degree by the Sepoy Rebellion of 1857,

rapid prog

ress in the development of a reformed Army establishment

V33j nevertheless, not immediately forthcoming.

51

During

the interval between the close of the Crimean War and the

Advent of the first Gladstone Ministry in late 1868, many
Changes were made in the military system,
were mechanical in nature;

.

organic.

but these changes

few, if any, were fundamentally

52
The character of Army reform during this period can

h& explained, in part, by the frequent changes in the office
49'
Erickson, p. 69.
50

The Indian Mutiny brought to light many defects in
the inelastic system of recruitment in the British Army,
for details see, "Inefficiency of the British Army," London
Quarterly Review, CXXIX (October, 1870) , 278.
51

Sheppard, p. 215.

^Clode, II, 390.
In a work of this kind it is
extremely difficult to apply any sort of justice to the
changes which occurred during this interval.
Admittedly,
cany changes were made, but it would be futile to list
Cham all for they did not organically affect the structure
Of the Army's organization.
For a brief account of the
Changes which occurred between 1854 and 1868 see Appendix A.

17

Of the Secretary of War since its institution in 1855.
&ord Panmure held the office for three years

(1855-1858),

ftltd Sidney Herbert held it for two (1859-1861) , but in
JfcWO other instances the term of office did not last one
year,

53

. .
Military legislation,

therefore, was not governed

by uniform policy for any great lengths, and this contributed
'to. much vacillation in purpose and planning.

There seemed little hope of lifting the Army out of
Its rut as the War Office failed to provide it with an
IKS&inistration and organization which was more in harmony
With the requirements of the day.

Prussia's fantastic rise

to. a powerful position of military strength, however, roused
iritain from her lethargy, not to panic, but to a healthy
cense of weakness by military comparison.

54

After Napoleon

crushed the Prussians at Jena in 1806, the British observed
tho Prussians as they gradually rebuilt their Army into -a
High state of efficiency and power.

In the meantime Britain's

Sliiitary strength dissipated with each succeeding generation.
5T
Appendix B, p. 146.
54

J. S. Omond, Parliament and the Army, 1642-1904
{Cambridge: The University Press, 1933), p. 106.
Hereafter
Cited as Omond.
55

Ibid.

pp. 106-10 7.

55

In 1864, during the Schleswig-Holstein War, the Prussian
Army tested its worth on the battlefields of Denmark.
years later in the short Seven Weeks 1 War

Two

(Austro-Prussian

fc&r) , the British were given additional proof of the
efficiency and power of the Prussian Army by witnessing
its rapid mobilization,
completeness in detail.

its advanced weaponry, and its
The brilliant successes of the

Prussian Army in these two. campaigns illustrated the power

Of a nation which possessed a relatively small peacetime
establishment, yet one which could be expanded at short
notice to many times that strength.

Britain realized that

In the event of war with Prussia she could expect a decisive

blow at an early moment.

It, therefore, became a necessity

to place the total military strength of the country on the
battlefield at the very outset of war.

56

.
With the existing

S&ilitary system this was impossible.
The Crimean War brought to Great Britain the
realization that many Army reforms were badly needed, but
HO one came forward to make them a reality.

With the shadow

Of Prussian war-clouds rising over the continent radical

~*^Army Do ok, pp. 44-45.

19

Changes in the military system were imperative.

The

military resources of the country had to be made more
available on sudden emergencies than recent experience
had shown them to be.

The stage was set, but where was

th© man of genius who would give impetus to a wise policy
.and' guide it in its progress?
With the Liberal victory at the polls in November
1068, William E. Gladstone became Britain's new Prime
Minister.

In his Cabinet Gladstone chose his able and

respected friend Edward T. Cardwell to become Secretary
Of War.

Unknown but to fate, this Peelite from Liverpool

W 6 to lead Britain's archaic Army establishment into an
era of military reform which was unprecedented in British

Ml story.

CHAPTER II
CARDWELL ARRIVES AT THE WAR OFFICE

Edward T. Cardwell was born in Liverpool on June 24,
1813, during the height of the Napoleonic Wars

As the son

Of John Cardwell, a prosperous merchant with extensive
business interests, young Edward was destined to receive an
fXcellent education.• He prepared for the University at
Winchester, and after completing his preparatory studies,
entered Balliol College, Oxford, in 1832, where he did
exceptionally well in his scholastic efforts.

Possessing

'OH excellent mind, which he diligently applied to all his
tasks, Cardwell won an open scholarship and earned a double
first class in classics and mathematics.

Following the

CSXapletion of his undergraduate studies, he was elected to
ft fellowship where he continued to display his scholarly
abilities.

■^Erickson, p. 5.
2

Erickson, p. 6; Biddulph, pp. 15-16; Wheeler, p. 16.
See also, George Stronach, "Edward Cardwell,” Dictionary of
Rational Biography, III, 952.
Hereafter cited as D. N. 13.
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In addition to pursuing his education at Oxford,
Cftrdwell formed life-long friendships with many able men who ■
Inter held high public office,

including among others,

Sidney Herbert, Robert Lowe, Roundell Palmer, and William E.
Gladstone.

3

In turn, each of these men later played vital

r©les in Cardwell's political career.
After quitting the University, Cardwell was called
‘to the bar in 1838 where he soon became quite prominent as
a lawyer.

His financial circumstances, however, allowed

lUo to remain independent from a profession, and he decided
to enter public service.

In 1842, Cardwell chose to run

for Parliament and was elected as a free-trade Conservative,
representing Clitheroe.^

During his first few years in

Parliament, Cardwell quietly acquainted himself with
parliamentary processes without distinguishing himself in
any particular manner.

In the meantime, however, he developed

a close political, as well as personal,

relationship with

^Erickson, p. 6.
^Erickson, p. 6; Biddulph, pp. 15-16; Wheeler, p. 186;
D. N. 13. , III, 952.
Clitheroe was a small borough in the
northeast corner of Lancashire.

Sir Robert Peel.

5

Their friendship was a natural one as

Cardwell resembled Peel in character and industry,^ while
Peel, in turn, admired Cardwell's special ability for
handling financial and commercial affairs.

By 1845,

Cardwell had so developed these talents he was firmly
established as a reliable defender of commercial interests.
That same year Peel rewarded him with an appointment to his
Conservative Ministry as Secretary to the Treasury.
With the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846, a rupture
Occurred in the Conservative Party between Peel and the
protectionists.
Hinistry fell.

The wound was fatal, and Peel's Conservative
In the period of political instability which

followed, Cardwell remained true to his chief and, together
with a small group of Peelites, continued to hold conservative
views' in general politics and liberal views in regard to

Commercial questions.

o

In 1847, during Cardwell's successful

^Erickson, p. 6; D. N. 13. , III, 952.
Their relation
ship became so close that on Peel's death in 1850, Cardwell
was appointed his literary executor in conjunction with Lord
t&ihon. Biddulph, p. 16.
6D. N. B ., III, 952.
7
Erickson, pp. 6-7; Biddulph, pp. 15-16; D. N. 13. ,
1X1, 952.

campaign for the Liverpool seat as an independent Conserva
tive, he and other Peelites attempted to organize the freetirade members of the Conservative Party into a separate
'political body.

The effort failed, but this group of

moderate progressive statesmen

(about forty in number) of

liberal -conservative principles voted together so consistently
lor a decade thereafter,

fSNjlite Party.

they were often referred to as the

9

As Liverpool 1s representative between 1847 and 1852,
Cardwell supported free-trade principles so consistently
that few of his constituents could find fault with h i m . ^

In the election of 1852, however, he lost his seat in the
ttOttse of Commons, but not in consequence of having voted
for the repeal of the Navigation Acts.

11

His defeat came

4# the result of a religious controversy arising from the
Issuance of a Papal Bull in 1850, which divided England
Into Territorial Sees and established a hierarchy of

^Erickson, pp. 8-9.

~^Ibid., p. 9.

■^George Stronach, author of Cardwell's biography
In the Dictionary of National Biography, states that
Cardwell lost his Liverpool seat in 1852 for having
ttOted for the repeal of.the Navigation Acts.
This is
Otter nonsense for commercial Liverpool was committed to
the repeal of the Navigation Acts just as was Cardwell.
D. N. B. , III, 952.
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*&i#hops.

This action was widely denounced throughout the

Country, and in response to it, Lord John Russell introduced
I# Parliament an Ecclesiastical Title Bill to prevent the
M l

from being put into effect.

Cardwell, along with other

Pt&lites, vigorously opposed the bill, but their efforts
Vcre in vain.

As a result of this high-church position,

Cardwell alienated enough of Liverpool\s Protestant electors
fey 1852 to prevent his election.

12

Cardwell contested another seat at Craigie, Ayrshire,
l&At same year, but again his high-church stand blocked his
return to Parliament.

Early in January 1853, the Oxford

fC&t was vacated, and again Cardwell sought election.
M d was successful

13

This

as Cardwell's high-church convictions

conservatism were more at home in the Oxford reprefentation.

-Even though Cardwell spent the rest of his public

life in the House of Commons representing Oxford, he continued

to hold the "Liverpool line" in his economic principles just
he had in the past.

14

■^Erickson, p. 10.
13Ibid., p. 12; D. N. B. , III, 952.
Erickson, p. 12.
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With the formation of Lord Aberdeen's coalition
#QVernment in 1852, Cardwell was invited to become President
the Board of Trade.

In Lord Aberdeen's Ministry, which

‘insisted of six Whigs, six Peelites, and one Radical,
Cardwell assumed his position on the Board of Trade without
fe&ving a seat in the Cabinet as Whig leaders protested the
*
15
J&trcre number of Peelites in the coalition.

Cardwell's

itment, .aside from his party role, was met with almost
tmiversal acceptance as he was.widely recognized as a
learned financier with a healthy appetite for work.

As

president of the Board of Trade, Cardwell was presented with
Ureal challenge for despite its partial reorganization in
i, when a railway department was added, it remained in
& confused state of affairs.

This challenge he eagerly

4C«pted.16
During the Crimean War, Cardwell had little to do
With military matters,

but his office skillfully handled

ftll the commercial problems relating to it.

15D. N.' B., Ill, 952.
~^Ibid. , p. 14.

17

These

16Erickson, p. 13.

Concerns were not all demanding, however, as the Crimean
iter was fought without significant disruptions in Britain's
■‘COWnercial. activities.

Most of Cardwell's attention was

directed toward difficulties at home concerning the British
railroad system.
it highly chaotic

At thistime the British railways were in
state of affairs as they had developed

haphazardly over the years without governmental supervision.
For the sake of public convenience, Cardwell proposed
legislation for the purpose of standardizing and systema
tizing the various railway lines.

His proposed legislation,

however, did not squarely face the question of whether the
fail roads were public or private affairs, and it left
failroad regulation strictly in the hands of private
enterprise.

Consequently, his efforts were unsuccessful. 18

While Cardwell failed to meet the needs of internal
trade in dealing

with therailway system,

success in regulating coastal and foreign
.J&effchant Shipping Bill of 1854,

19

he had more
shipping.

His

codified existing laws

relating to shipping, added important amendments and

~^Ibid., pp. 15-16.
19

For a discussion of the Merchant Shipping Bill
and its amendments, see Erickson, pp. 16-19.

27

which to this day, forms the basic foundation
the code of the British Merchant Marine.

20

In January 1855, Lord Aberdeen's Government gave way
subsequent Ministry by Lord Palmerston, but Cardwell
iWfcinued to remain at the Board of Trade.

On the discovery,

jfeifttever, that Palmerston intended to give in to a demand for
$H' inquiry into the conduct of the Crimean War, a demand
t&tch Lord Aberdeen had refused, Cardwell, along with
ffeftiite-s Sir James Graham, Sidney Herbert, and William E.
Httdstone, resigned.

After his resignation,

Palmerston

%tieapted to retain Cardwell's services by offering him
post of Chancellor of the Exchequer.

Cardwell was

fluttered, but out of loyalty to his friends he refused
Im

'

offer.

21

During his next few years in Parliament, Cardwell
1P#ted as an independent liberal-conservative, but gradually
fttvitated toward the Liberal Party.

22

Late in 1856,

!#W0ver, he voted against Lord Palmerston's Ministry on & Censure resolution pertaining to the Chinese War.
20
21

D. N. B ., III, 952.
Biddulph, p. 16; Erickson, pp. 19-20.

22D. N. B., Ill, 952.

The

28

4;§&§#®&ge of this resolution brought about Palmerston's
'■'*JMtalIgnition, and on the appeal to the country which followed,
v. ■

,’^ C ^ e l l lost his Oxford seat in the House of Commons in the
■fpiSPlftg elections of 1857.

Charles Neate, the successful

however, was unseated by petition for violating
Corrupt Practices Act,

and in a new election Cardwell

returned to Parliament by a majority of fifty-three votes
his opponent, William Thackery. 23
1

Despite the vote of confidence which Palmerston

iftceived in the elections of 1857, he remained as Prime
isfcer hardly a year when the Orsini assassination attempt
the life of the French Emperor Napoleon III brought
his downfall.:

As a result, Lord Derby formed a

:ely Conservative Ministry in 1858, but the wily
f^lfflerston was back in office the following year.

24

In

Palmerston Cabinet Cardwell was chosen to become
for Ireland.

At this post he continued to demon-

#|;rate his usual patience and industry,
■iW

25

but despite his

intentions, Cardwell's efforts had little effect on

t-

^ D . N. B_. , III, 953; Erickson, pp. 21-22.
24Erickson, pp. 23-25.

25D. N. B..-IXI,

953.
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*$t»iand's -economic plight.

As a result, he was quite

'^congenial in this position.
In July 1861, ill-health forced Sidney Herbert to
i
v.IAfign from the Palmerston Ministry as Secretary of War.
the Cabinet re-shuffling which followed, Cardwell
the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, a Cabinet
position without portfolio.

27

Cardwell could hardly regard

.vtMs change as a promotion, but the Ministry utilized this
ftftnial office to engage his advice and counsel for all
Ipovernment departments.

In this respect Cardwell was of

Special aid to Gladstone,

the Chancellor of the Exchequer,

he provided him with assistance on financial, banking,
j-

'
currency
questions. 28
Cardwell remained as Chancellor of the Duchy of

&s*ncaster from July 1861, to April 1864, when he became
Oo-lonial Secretary upon the resignation of the Duke of
Sfitfwcastle.

29

•
As Colonial Secretary, he played an important

For details of Cardwell's performance as Secretary
Ireland, see Erickson, pp. 26-32.
^Erickson,

p. 32; D. N. _B. , III, 953.

^Erickson,

p. 32.

29

Ibid. For a detailed account of Cardwell's
Activities in the Colonial Office, see Erickson, pp. 32-66.

30

VOlft in the development of a policy which his predecessor
)

.

.

initiated shortly before his resignation.

30

At a

'tiw when a large proportion of the British Army was servinq
14 the colonies, Cardwell carried out Newcastle's principle
,#f Withdrawing Imperial troops which the Colonies would
financially support during peace time.

This policy not

4&Iy relieved the British taxpayer of an expense, but it
promoted the development of Britain's modern system
* colonial self-government and self-defense. 31

Later,

it

have an important bearing on Cardwell's subsequent work
44

Army reformer.
Upon the death of Lord Palmerston in .1865, Cardwell

trained at the Colonial office until Palmerston's successor,
Russell, resigned on June 27 of the following year.

33

I&tssell's resignation came on the question of reforming the
iamentary franchise,

something which Russell had long

3QHansard's, CXCIV, 1116.
31D. N. JB., III, 953; Wheeler, pp. 186-187.
32
33

See below, pp. 38-39.
Biddulph, p. 16; Erickson, p. 16.

31

'-retired.34 Exhausted from his labors at the Colonial
*v'"'''
-riiif4c«, Cardwell departed for an extended vacation in
,

35

Hi,"'/ ■
** ,„

Upon his return, Cardwell found the Conservative

* ISbfby Government vitally taken up with the question of
% ,plfliaraentary Reform.
When the Derby Ministry came to
“
;
fol lowing Russell's resignation, few thought it
*&>;
l.W '

■.

^i^ald'have any chance to pass a reform bill.
Derby's
■■
^■MPOrity Government was looked upon as an interim,
:■

the Liberals could re-form their party lines,

,Itlurn to power, and pass a franchise bill.

Mainly

.|h*ough ■the efforts of Benjamin Disraeli, Chancellor
*i
..«*

Exchequer and Conservative leader in the House of
, this did not occur as he successfully managed
Reform Bill of 1867.

36

Elie Hal^Vy and R. B. McCallum, Victorian Years,
1841-1895 f Vol. IV of Hal^vy's A History of the English
jjNooie in the Nineteenth Century, Translated by E. I.
fetkin (6 vols.; New York: Barnes and Noble, 1961), 441.
t$frr«after cited as Hal^vy.
35

. _

Erickson, p. 66.

^ " T h e Bill As It Is, " Blackwood1s Edinburgh
ffigazfne, CII (August., 1867), 253.

32

In February 1868, Disraeli replaced the ailing Derby
as Prime Minister,
than a year.

37

a position Disraeli would hold less

Although Disraeli had successfully manipulated

the reform of the Parliamentary franchise,

the popularity

of his Ministry waned as he absorbed- defeats in April and
May of 1868, on Gladstone’s resolutions proposing the
disestablishment of the Irish Church. 38

Unable to sustain

such defeats, Disraeli announced that Parliament would be
dissolved that autumn so general elections could take place
under the franchise created by the Reform Bill of 1867.

39

Both parties waged vigorous campaigns, but on November 23,
1868, the Liberal Party overwhelmed the Conservatives at
the polls.

40

With the Liberal victory, Gladstone was

summoned by Queen Victoria.on December 1 to become Britain’s
new Prime Minister.

41

Many assumed that in the new Liberal Ministry Cardwell
would become Chancellor of the Exchequer, as he had been

■^John Morley, The Life of William Ewart Gladstone
(New York: The Macmillian Company, 1903), II, 244.
Here
after cited as Morley.
38
40

x
Ha levy., IV, 444.

39

Morley,

41Ibid., p. 2 52

II, 2 51.

Erickson, p. 66.

33

offered the post in the past.

42

Instead, on December 4

Cardwell received Gladstone's invitation to become head of
the War Office.

Three days later on December 7 an official

announcement was made of. Cardwell's decision to accept the
4- 43
appointment.

As 'Cardwell assumed the office of Secretary of War,
Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine lamented,
not to be sorry for Mr. Cardwell." 44

"It is impossible

He ". . . reigns,

the supreme head over the most expensive, and we may
venture to add, by far the most inefficient military
establishment on the face of the earth." 45

Such remorse

was unnecessary for Cardwell was not unaware of the
difficult tasks which lay ahead.

During the Crimean War,

while serving as President of the Board of Trade, and then

^Erickson,

p. 67.

^Biddulph, p. 1.
f 44 "How Is The Country Governed?"
Magazine, CX (September, 1871), 394.
45

Blackwood's Edinburgh

Ibid., p. 393.
Such a charge was not too difficult
to substantiate as the British Army was only one-sixth the
size of the French Army, but yet the expenditures for. both
were almost equal.
In comparison with the Prussian Army,
the British Army was only one-twelfth the size, yet military
expenditures were double.
J. E. Cairnes, "Our Defences:
A National or a Standing Army," Fortnightly Review, IX
(February 1, 1871), 170.

34

later, and more directly, as Colonial Secretary, Cardwell
had gained ample knowledge of the costly inefficient Army
system.

He was firmly convinced that the War Department could

be run more efficiently and more economically.

As the new

Secretary of War he would have almost six years to prove it.46
Cardwell knew that if ever unity and economy were to
be introduced into the organization and administration of
the military forces, his energy as Secretary of War had to
be dedicated toward achieving three objectives.

First of

all, he had to continue the unification of the War Office
begun during the Crimean War.

Secondly, he had to effect

a proper division in the administrative duties of the War
Department.

Thirdly, he had to lay the foundation for

arranging the military forces of Great Britain into an
effective system of national defense.

47

These objectives were by no means a radical departure
from the past, but Cardwell knew that before these goals
ever became realities many obstacles had to be overcome.
First, there was the question of finance.

Military reforms

involved great sums of money, and Parliament was not eager
46

Erickson, p. 67.

47

Biddulph, pp. 2 5-26.

to appropriate funds for such purposes.

AQ

Secondly, reform

involved social difficulties, particularly among the upperclasses.

This section of British society was indisposed

to severing ancient connections, especially when Army reform
involved land owners and the nation's institutions.

In

addition, Army officers were looked upon to provide color
and gaiety at social functions; the upper-classes did not
wish to see this dimmed by Army reform. 49

Thirdly, neither

the Conservative Party nor the Liberal Party was inclined
toward reform but both for different reasons.

The Conserva

tives were the natural ally of the wealthy upper-classes,
who for social reasons, wished to maintain the status quo
for the Army.

The Liberals, on the other hand, were economy

minded for financial reasons and not above reducing reform
budgets. 50

Lastly, Army reform faced serious constitutional

difficulties for traditionally the control of the Army
rested in the hands of the Crown.

Reform measures, emanating

from the Secretary of War, would only weaken the authority
and influence that the control of the Army gave to the Crown.

Erickson, p. 69; Wheeler, p. 187.
^Erickson,

pp. 69-70.

^ Ibid. , p. 70.

36

Naturally, neither Queen Victoria, nor her cousin the Duke
of Cambridge,

the Commander-in-Chief, nor the bulk of the

Army officers, would look with favor upon weakening the
military prerogative of the Crown.
Early in December 1868,

51

shortly after his appointment,

Cardwell began preparing a memorandum on the whole question
of Army reform for presentation to the Cabinet.

52

As recent

events in Europe had already brought the question into
focus, Cardwell felt the new Liberal Ministry would soon
be forced to deal with the matter.

In this memorandum,

which Cardwell presented to the Cabinet early in January
1869,

53

he accurately forecast that before anything could

be done about general Army reform the Secretary of War
had to be acknowledged the final authority on all military
matters.

54

Cardwell explained to the Cabinet that theo

retically the Commander-in-Chief was subordinate to the
Secretary of War, but in reality both offices held dual
control over the military establishment as neither office
was independent, nor subordinate to the other.

55

Even though

51 Ibid.

57

-^Erickson, p. 70.

^^Biddulph, p. v.

~^Ibid., p. vii.

Biddulph, p. v.

37

the Duke of Cambridge, as Commander-in-Chief, had tacitly
submitted to the Secretary of War as his superior, Cardwell
stated that this would not do as an official arrangement.

56

As Cardwell attempted to deal with this problem of
Army administration he encountered much opposition for
two schools of thought existed on the matter of military
control.

The first was the "professional" school, and it

maintained that any individual who administered the affairs
of the Army had to possess a distinguished record in the
. .
. 5 7
military service.

Cardwell, however, was not of like mind

as he was never a member of the military service, a fate for
which the Quarterly Review soundly condemned him as not having
a single qualification for heading the War Office. 58

Instead,

Cardwell chose to belong to the "constitutional" school of
thought which held the view that the Army was under the
control of Parliament and its representative.

Since Cardwell

based the authority of his office on this principle,

it was

only natural that his initial efforts at ending dual control
56
58

Erickson, p. 70.

57
Ibid., p. 67.

"Inefficiency of the British Army," Quarterly
Review, CXXIX (July-October, 1870), 509. Hereafter cited
as "Inefficiency of the British Army."
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would be met with severe opposition from Army officers and
their friends, both m

and out of Parliament. 59

Before Cardwell could gain much momentum toward
ending dual control in the military establishment, he
had to direct his energies toward the preparation of the
Army Estimates for the coming year.

As Secretary of War

Cardwell knew that he was expected by the Ministry to cut
military expenditures without weakening the nation's
defenses at home or abroad. 60

He did not consider such a

task impossible for on January 9, 1869, in a letter to
Gladstone, Cardwell proposed an arrangement whereby an
efficient defensive force could be maintained at a greatly
reduced cost.

He informed Gladstone that he was prepared

to reduce the colonial forces from 50,000 to 2 6,000, place
the discipline of the Militia under the War Office and train
it with the Army, and eliminate the inefficient corps within
the Volunteers and combine its training with the Militia and
the Army. 61
The first of these changes,

the reduction of colonial

forces, was the most important as Cardwell considered this

^Ericks on, p. 67.
^•^Ibid. , p. 26.

^Biddulph,

p. 25.

39

policy to be a progressive step toward general Army reform.
This proposed action was merely a continuation of the
principle of colonial self-reliance which had its development
during his tenure as Colonial Secretary. 62

By reducing the

colonial forces Cardwell hoped that in the future it would
not be as difficult to encourage enlistments as it had in
the past.

With increased enlistments the period of foreign

service could eventually be reduced and a balance struck
between home service and service abroad.

Cardwell hoped

that this would pave the way to a shorter enlistment period,
something which he considered essential for a healthy Army
■
4-63
organization.

On March 11, 1869, Cardwell presented his much-'
awaited Army Estimates to the House of Commons for the
coming fiscal year— April 1, 1869, to March 31, 1 8 7 0 . ^
He announced the net expenditure for the Army services at
£12,047,600 which compared to £13,331,000 for the previous
62

See above, pp. 2 9-30.

^Biddulph,

pp. 26-27.

64Hansard1s , CXCIV, 1111.
For an itemized account
of expenditures see, B_. S_. P., "Army Estimates of Effective
and Non-Effective Services for 1869-70," XXXVI (1868-1869),
2- 201.
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year, a reduction of £1,283,400.

65

This retrenchment was

made possible during Cardwell's first year in office by
his policy of withdrawing troops from the colonies which,
in turn, activated further reductions in the purchase of
military supplies.bb

By reducing the number of troops in

the colonial stations Cardwell was able, not only to reduce
military expenditures, but also to increase the estimate of
troops for home defense in the coming year to 92,015 men, as
compared with 87,505 for the previous year. 67
To many individuals it looked as if Cardwell was
strengthening home defenses at the expense of the colonies,
but he argued the latter would not be weakened.

On the

contrary, his policy would strengthen the colonies for it
would force them to rely more on their own resources.^
Furthermore,
stated,

the colonies had no need of fear for as Cardwell

". . . they live under the aegis of . . . England,

and . . . war with them is war with England. 69
During Cardwell's long speech on the Estimates, he
outlined to the House of Commons what his future intentions

65Hansard's, CXCIV, 1111.

66Erickson, p. 72.

67Hansard's , CXCIV, 1114.

68Ibid., p. 1117.

69Ibid.

were for the Army.

He felt that Great Britain, protected

by her insular location and large.Navy, needed only a
small but efficient peace-time Army, yet one capable of
easy expansion.

This Army needed to be provisioned with

materiel of the highest quality, but he cautioned that
supplies should never be allowed to accumulate to such
large proportions that wear or obsolescence became a
danger.

70

Furthermore, he stated that necessity demanded

stronger relations be developed and. maintained between the
Regular Army and the auxiliary forces in order to derive
the maximum advantage from their combined strength.

71

Cardwell concluded by stating that the Army Estimates were
founded on the ". . . determination that nothing should be
allowed to injure the efficiency of the service, or the
interests of the country.”

72

At the .conclusion of his address, Cardwell received
warm praise from both sides of the aisle, not only for
showing a considerable reduction in the Estimates, but also
for conjecturing future improvements in the military system.

7QIbid., p. 1123.

71Ibid., pp. 1124-1129.

72Ibid., p. 1139.
73Ibid., pp. 1140, 1151, 1157, 1162, 1165.
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42

Strangely enough/ Cardwell made only slight reference to
the fact that the relationship between the War Office and
the Horse Guards was under review, and made no mention of
needed administrative reforms at the War O f f i c e . ^
result,

As a

the professional soldiers were somewhat relieved

at what they considered to be a mild program of Army reform;
nevertheless,

they remained apprehensive as to what Cardwell

might do next. 7 5

They would not have long to wait.

^ Ibid., p. 1139.

7S

DErickson, p. 73.

CHAPTER III
WAR OFFICE REORGANIZATION

Upon accepting the seals of the War Office, Cardwell
stipulated that Lord Northbrook be appointed his Under
secretary of State for War.^

Cardwell's preference for

this important position was a man who possessed excellent
credentials as an administrator.

Prior to his elevation to

the House of Lords, Northbrook served in the House of Commons
for ten years, holding appointments as Lord of the Admiralty,
Under-Secretary of State for War,
Home Office.

2

for India, and for the

A man of Northbrook's ability and experience

might well have sought higher office, but he chose to accept
Cardwell's invitation to become his Under-Secretary. . As it
turned out, the office proved to be more important, and the
work more arduous,

than many other offices of higher rank.

Capitalizing on the thoroughness and energy with
which Northbrook discharged his administrative duties,

^Bernard Mallet, Thomas George: Earl Of Northbrook
(London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1908), p. 48. Hereafter
cited as Mallet.
9

3
Mallet, p. 48.

Erickson, p. 70.
43

3

Cardwell appointed him chairman of a small committee to
inquire into the existing arrangements for conducting the
business of the Army departments,
Guards.

4

including the Horse

Northbrook's Committee, as it was known, conducted

a thorough investigation, and its conclusions were presented
to Parliament in three successive reports— -one in March 1869,
a second in May of the same year, and a third in February
1870.5
The first of these reports' was submitted to Parliament
on March 11, 1869, the same day that Cardwell presented his
Army Estimates for the fiscal year 1869-1870.

In this

report the Northbrook Committee analyzed the supervision
of expenditures incurred by the various administrative
departments within the War Office.

It discovered that the

Army departments functioned under the traditional theory
of financial control, whereby they were constantly checked
watched, and distrusted.

Thus, two antagonistic powers

4Ibid. ,
5S. S. P ., "Report of the Committee appointed to
Inquire into the Arrangements in Force for the Conduct
o f Business in the A rwy , ” X2I (1870) r. 3-24addition
to Northbrook, tbe following? individaals vgie also on ubs
c o m itte e z
J. 5 tans f eldf W- 5- Anderson/ and Edward Eti^aurd.
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existed within the War Office as the various departments
sought to increase expenditure, while administrative policy
sought to check expenditure.
thus m

conflict.

6

Efficiency and economy were

The Northbrook Committee recommended

that a better system of management lay in the harmonization
\

of finance and administration through the Secretary of War.
Rather than maintaining a critical division of War Office
administration,

the Northbrook Committee suggested that

the Secretary of War, since he was responsible for both
finance and administration,

could attend to financial

considerations on administrative policy from its inception.
Thereby, he could prevent financial matters from hindering
administrative policy during the development of the latter
during each fiscal year.

7

Since it was impossible for the Secretary of War to
observe all the demands of financial expenditure,

the

Northbrook Committee advised that a subordinate Parliamentary
officer be created to assist him ". . . in the success of
the whole administration of the Army . . . ."

^Ibid., p . 3.
8Ibid.

Abid.

O

Termed the

Financial Secretary,

this officer, using the existing

Accountant-General's Department as his staff, could
supervise the compilation of the Army Estimates which
. .
.
originated m

the various administrative departments.

9

By

imposing on the department heads the responsibility of
constructing the Estimates in accordance with the financial
and administrative policies of the government as set forth
by the Secretary of War, efficiency and economy could more
easily be introduced into the overall administration of
a
10
the Army.

4.-U

Ironically,

the newly recommended policy of harmonizing

finance with administration was anticipated by Cardwell.
During the preparation of the Army Estimates for 1869-1870,
he had instructed the various department heads in the
responsibility of constructing Army expenditures in accordance
with administrative policy.

As a result, Cardwell was able

to reduce the Army Estimates for the coming fiscal year by
a considerable amount;
first report,

therefore,

in the conclusion of its

the Northbrook Committee commended Cardwell

for having previously adopted a policy which made this
reduction possible."^

9Ibid.

, p. 4.

^ Ibid.
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On May 7, 1869,
report,

two months after submitting its first

the Northbrook Committee presented a second in which.

it reviewed administrative policy on the question of Army
transport and supply.

12

Two years earlier,

committee presided over by Lord Strathnairn,

in 1867, a
recommended the

fusion of the departments of Supply, Transport, Commissariat,
Stores,

13
Purveyors, and Barracks under a Controller-in-Chief.

Sir John Pakington,

then Secretary of War, accepted the

recommendation of the Strathnairn Committee and appointed
Sir Henry Storks as head of the newly created Control
.
14
Department by placing h i m ■in charge of the reorganization.
While Pakington carried out the main recommendation of the
Strathnairn Committee,

the Northbrook Committee pointed out

that he did not adopt its proposal to create a separate
Ordnance Department.

With the understanding that Pakington

had left this suggestion for future consideration,

15

Northbrook Committee recommended that the provision,

the
custody,

~^Ibid. , p. 6.
~^Ibid., "Copy of Correspondence between the Treasury
and the War Office respecting the formation of the Department
of Control," XLII (1867-1868), 877.
^ Ibid. Sir Henry Storks remained as Controller-inChief under Edward Cardwell, Pakington's successor.
15Ibid. , XII

(.1870), 6.
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and issuance of war munitions continue to remain part of the
Control- Department.

In regard to this question the Northbrook

Committee felt that unity of administration greatly outweighed
any advantages which might be derived from the creation of
separate departments. 16
After submitting its second report Lord Northbrook's
Committee immediately proceeded to its third task which
involved an investigation of the administration of the War
Office and the Horse Guards.

In pursuit of this inquiry it

took a considerable amount of evidence, and its third report,
which led to important results, was not presented to Parliament
until February 12, 1870.

17

In the report the Northbrook

Committee pointed out that dual control existed:
. . . between the War Office and the Horse Guards,
i/and7r the habit is still to prefer a system of
unnecessary check, double labour, and divided
responsibility to one of well-defined responsi
bility, simplicity, and confidence.
Instead of dual control,

the Northbrook Committee recommended

that a sound system of Army administration be based on the

16Ibid., p. 7.
^ Ibid, , p. 10.

^ Ibid. , p. 9.
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following principles:

(1) The Secretary of War was the

responsible head of Army administration; therefore, all
Army departments had to be responsible to him;

(2) The

Secretary of War, of necessity, dealt with the large
questions of policy and planning; therefore,

the daily task

of Army administration had to be conducted by the department
heads under him and their subordinates.

In conclusion,

the Northbrook Committee stated that these recommendations
were based on the assumption that arrangements were in
19
progress for ending dual.control.
Upon becoming Secretary of War, Cardwell realized
that until his civilian office was established as the
supreme, unquestioned authority of Army administration,
the War Department would continue to remain subject to
separate staffing, duplication of duties, and departmental
squabbling.

Thus, while the Northbrook Committee was

preparing and presenting its reports, Cardwell was struggling
to centralize the administration of the Army under his
control.

These efforts were made extremely difficult by the

presence of the Duke of Cambridge in the office of the

•^-^Ibid.

50

Commander-in-Chief at the Horse Guards.

20

Since becoming

the.Commander-in-Chief in 1857, the Duke had conducted
his command without significant interference from the War
Office;, therefore, he had come to regard his position as
21

almost unassailable by 1869. ‘

Not only was the Duke unduly

autocratic and extremely conservative in military matters,
but he was also ". . . imbued with the most rigid opinions
as to the relationship of the Sovereign with the Army . . . .
In addition, he possessed a strong sense of personal dignity
which fortified his conviction that the prestige of the
Commander-in-Chief would be destroyed if his office were
moved to Pall Mall and placed under the direct control of
the Secretary of War. 2 3
In the same strain the Queen wrote to Cardwell
admonishing him that " . . .

such a step could not fail to

damage the position of the Commander-in-Chief."

20

Erickson, p. 73.

21

22

Ibid. , p. 164.

2 3 0 mond,

24

Along

Wheeler, p. 184.
p. 112 .

2^George Earle Buckle (ed.), The Letters of Queen
Victoria (2nd series; New York: Longmans, Green and Co.,
1926), I, 584-585.
Hereafter cited as Letters of Queen
Victoria.

with her cousin the Duke of Cambridge,

the Queen simply

did not understand the necessity of reorganizing the
administration of the Army.

Her opposition,

therefore,

forced Cardwell to postpone any definite action on dual
control until the Northbrook Committee completed its study
and made its recommendations.

25

MeanWhile., to avoid Her Majesty's displeasure
Cardwell proceeded with great caution.

In answer to

questions in the House of Commons he denied that dual
control existed either in theory or principle,

26

and

defended this position by referring to an Order-inCouncil,

issued on October 11, 1861, which restricted the

Commander-in-Chief to the authority of the Secretary of War.
Cardwell, however, was aware that communications between his
office and the Horse Guards were conducted by official
correspondence just like any two other government offices.
2 5Erickson, p. 73.
2 6 Hansard1s ,
27

CXCVII,

B. S. P., XXXVI

145.

(1868-69),

591.

2
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which were entirely independent of each other.

28

As

Secretary of War, he conducted the civil administration of
the Army while the Commander-in-Chief exercised direct
authority over the military forces.

oQ

Realistically,

however, Cardwell knew that dual control existed but to
openly admit it and advocate its abolition meant an attack
upon the military prerogative of the Crown before he had
the political support to do so. 30
After the Northbrook Committee made public its
recommendation to end dual control, Cardwell's effort to
abolish the system gained considerable momentum.

But

before Cardwell could take political action, he had to
maneuver the Duke of Cambridge into attending weekly
meetings of the War Council which was composed of the
heads of the various Army departments.

When Cardwell

first suggested such meetings for the purpose of
28

The drawbacks of such an arrangement were obvious.
Matters that could be easily settled with the spoken word
were clumsily drawn out by correspondence.
Later that same
year (1869) Cardwell forbade correspondence between the War
Office and the Horse Guards and established a common
registry for the letters of both.
This reduced the number
of letters for that year by thirty-thousand in the War
Office alone.
Biddulph, pp. 54-55.
^ Ibid. , p. 22 6 .

30

Erickson, p. 73.
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administrative planning, the Duke agreed with the idea but
refused to attend unless his staff was allowed to accompany
him.

The Duke, inclined to be overly concerned with his

prestige as Commander-in-Chief, was worried that his
dignity would .be impaired if his advisers were not present
in the assemblage of Cardwell's staff.

Cardwell, however,

denied the Duke's request as he informed His Royal Highness
that he did not need the advice of the Duke's staff, but
he did need the counsel of his Commander-in-Chief. 31
Diplomatically,

Cardwell wrote to the Duke stating that

he was prepared "'to look to Your Royal. Highness as my
principle military adviser,

in a sense, and to a degree,

not yet practiced . . . . ' '

In deterrence to this

cajolery by the Secretary of War the Duke agreed to attend
the War Council, meetings without his staff, and regular
meetings of the War Council were held on a weekly basis
.
33
for the first time in British History.
By no means ignorant of Cardwell's intention to
remove his office from the Horse Guards and place it in the

31

, •,
Ibid.,
p . 75.

"^Cardwell Papers 30/48/3-13: 208.
Cardwell to the
Duke of Cambridge, April 12, 1870, as cited by Erickson, p. 75.
^Erickson,

p. 75.
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War Department at Pall Mall, the Duke of Cambridge fully
realized that his position as Commander-in-Chief was
gradually becoming more and more subordinate to the
authority of the Secretary of War.

In an effort to fore

stall his inevitable removal to the War Office,

the Duke

compromisingly suggested that he go to Pall Mall whenever
the Secretary of War wished to see him.
refused to

grant

Cardwell, however,

such a concession. 34

In the meantime Cardwell prepared a draft of an
Order-in-Co'uncil which clearly defined the duties of the
Commander-in-Chief as subordinate to the Secretary of War
and limited the Duke's successors to a five year tenure.
Cardwell sent this document to .the Duke who reluctantly
approved it after the Secretary of War agreed to extend
the command of His Royal Highness over the British military
forces in Canada and Ireland. 3 5
Royal military prerogative,

Fearing a threat to her

the Queen did not wish to

sign the Order, but did so on June 4, 1870, 36 on the
formal request of her Prime Minister.
34

Wheeler, p. 196.

3 6 B.

S. P., XLII

^Morley,

35

(1870), 683.

II, 360-361.

37

With Her Majesty's

Erickson, p. 75.
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signature the office of the Commander-in-Chief became what
Cardwell intended it to be, a departmental office under
3 0

the direction of the Secretary of War.

Although the

Commander-in-Chief and his staff were not removed from
•3 q

the Horse Guards to Pall Mall until 1871,

the Duke was

given a temporary room at the War Office where he lamentingly
wrote his letters under the address,

"Horse Guards,

Pall

40
Mall."
In spite of the removal of the Commander-in-Chief
from the Horse Guards to the War Office, Cardwell knew this
would not end the confusion and inefficiency which resulted
from administrative mismanagement.

Hence, he was still

faced with the task of evolving a workable administrative
arrangement at the War Office.

It appeared to the Secretary

of War that the best solution to the problem was to make a
statutory distribution of administrative duties in the War
Department.^

Fortunately, along with recommending the

^Erickson,

p. 75.

39 Biddulph points out that some individuals had
suggested the move should not have taken place until a
new War Office building was constructed.
Such a sine die
postponement would have been unwise for a new War Office
building was not completed until 19U3.
Biddulph, p. 142.
40

Omond, p. 114.

^Biddulph,

p. 238.

56

abolition of dual control,

the Northbrook Committee outlined

such a distribution in its third report.

It recommended

that the business of the Army be conducted by three large
departments: the Military,
In addition,

the Control, and the Financial.

it recommended that Army administration be given

more representation in Parliament as the Army was limited to
the Secretary of War and his Under-Secretary.

The Royal

Navy, on the other hand, was represented by four officials
plus all the members of the Board of Admiralty.
Northbrook Committee suggested,

therefore,

The

that the heads

of the Control and Financial Departments be made eligible
to assist the Secretary of War in representing the Army in'
Parliament.

42

Acting on these recommendations in. extenso, Cardwell
secured the passage of the War Office Act in April 1870.

43

This act divided the administration of the Army into three
huge departments,

the heads of which became eligible to

represent the Army in Parliament.

42

B. S.'P., XII

44

Under the provisions

(1870), 10-11.

42For the complete bill, see B. S.. P., IV (1870),
779-780.
44

Biddulph, p. 54.

of this act, the Military Department was placed under the
Commander-in-Chief who became the Secretary of War's chief
military adviser.

45

In addition to the Regular Army,

the

Commander-in-Chief was given charge over the auxiliary force
as well as the following branch departments:

Military

Education, Chaplain's, Medical, and Topographical, of which
the latter ultimately became the Intelligence Department.^
The second division of Army administration was the Control
Department.

Its head,

the Controller-in-Chief, newly named

the Surveyor-General of Ordnance, 47 was charged with all
matters concerning supply,
munitions.

transport,

The third department,

45B.

S . P., XII

clothing, and war

the Financial branch was

(1870), 11.

^Biddulph, p. 54. Cardwell established the Intelli
gence Department in 187 3. The function of this department
was to prepare information regarding fortifications, equip
ment, means of supply and transport, numbers of all military
units in every part of the country, and anything else which
might be desired by the Secretary of War or the Commanderin-Chief.
Since the department was patterned after the
logistics branch of Prussian military science, the Intelli
gence Department in no way carried out the functions which
are generally associated with the Army Intelligence of the
present day.
Hansard 1s , CCXIV, 871-87 3.
4 7 Tbj_d, , p. 52.
Sir Henry Storks was elected M. P.
in 1870 and continued as the head of this department until
the end of Gladstone's first Ministry in 1874.
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placed under a Financial Secretary who became responsible
to the Secretary of War for preparing the Army Estimates.
In addition, he was charged with the appropriation, accounting,
and audit of all funds which Parliament made available to the
Army.

48

. . .
In conjunction with the three major divisions of Army

administration there was also a fourth, but it remained out
side the three main branches and dealt with matters which
did not pertain to any of the other three.

This minor branch

was called the Central Department and was headed by the
49
Under-Secretary.
To complete the fusion of all military and adminis
trative departments under the Secretary of War Cardwell felt
yet another change was necessary.

In a memorandum to the

Queen in January 1871, Cardwell suggested that the Military
Secretary be appointed by the Secretary of War so that
matters of discipline and appointments in the military
forces could be submitted to the Secretary of War by a
public official. 50

Up until this time the' Military Secretary

48

• •
Ibid., p. 54. Cardwell appointed J. C. Vivian
as Financial Secretary in 1869.
He was followed in 1871
by Henry Campbell-Bannerman.
Wheeler, pp. 193-194.
^Wheeler,
50

pp. 190-191.

Letters of Queen Victoria, II, 113.
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had been a member of the personal staff of the Commander-inChief and chosen by him.

51

The Queen was reluctant to

change such an arrangement as she was fearful that in
matters relating to discipline and appointments the Secretary
of War would consult the Military Secretary instead of the
Commander-in-Chief.
. . m

She felt this would place the Duke

a very anomalous position . . . ."

52

In order to

remove her apprehensions Cardwell informed the Queen that
the Military Secretary would continue to remain an officer
of high rank, subject to approval by Her Majesty and
subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief.

Moreover, he added

that without her approval on this matter Parliament would:
. . . not consent to vest
Chief the extensive power
is necessary both for the
and also for the union of
with the Regulars. 53

in the Commander-inof selection, which
abolition of purchase,
the Reserve Forces

In spite of this appeal,' the Queen remained immovable in her
position.

Finally, Cardwell agreed to a compromise and

allowed the Commander-in-Chief to select the Military
Secretary, but he remained insistent that the appointment
51

Erickson, p. 76.

52 Letters of Queen Victoria, II, 115.
~^Ibid., p. 116.
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be confirmed by the Secretary of War.

54

With the assurance

that this proposed arrangement would in no way alter the
position of the Commander-in-Chief on military matters
concerning discipline and appointments,
her consent to Cardwell's arrangement.

the Queen gave

55

With the fulfillment of this compromise, Cardwell
completed his plan for reorganizing the administration of
the Army under the control of the Secretary of War.

Unlike

his predecessors at the War Office, Cardwell did not attempt
to build an efficient military department on the confusion
of administrative offices; instead, he sought to remedy the
confusion before he attempted to develop an efficient Army
organization.

56

It was on this premise that he secured

both the abolition of dual control and the passage of the
War Office Act.

Thereby, the Secretary of War was made

responsible to Parliament for all the administrative depart
ments of the Army whose duties were now clearly defined.
Having "put his house in order," Cardwell began to
turn his attention toward developing a plan to abolish the

^Omond,

pp. 116-117.

55

Letters of Queen Victoria, II, 118.

56

Biddulph, p. vi.
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centuries old practice of purchasing military commissions
in the British Army.

Cardwell did not know it, but he was

facing his most difficult test as an Army reformer.

CHAPTER IV
THE ABOLITION OF PURCHASE

The system of purchasing military commissions had
long attracted much public attention as over the years it
had been repeatedly investigated by Royal Commissions,
heatedly debated in Parliament, and voluminously discussed
in phamphlets and newspapers.'*'

In the House of Commons

annual motions called for its abolition but without success.
As Secretary of War, Sidney Herbert once entertained the
idea of seeking its abolition but dropped the matter when
he encountered strong opposition from many quarters. 2

In

spite of this renewed agitation .for the abolition of the
purchase system,

the issue did not gain much momentum until

the advent of Gladstone's first Ministry,

3

which coincided

^"Purchase in the Army," Quarterly Review, CXXIV
(January-April, 1868), 525.
Hereafter cited as "Purchase
in the Army."
2

Omond, p. 121.

3
Justin McCarthy, A History of Our Own Times (New
York: United States Book Company, 1894), IV, 566.
Hereafter
cited as McCarthy.
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with the dramatic achievements of Prussia's military system
on the continent.
Witnessing the military might of Prussia, exemplified
first in 1866, and then 1870, Edward Cardwell realized that
if Great Britain were to defend herself against the possible
threat of Prussian militarism,

it would be necessary to

amalgamate the auxiliary forces with the Regular Army in
order to create a more harmonious and compact fighting
4

machine.

This task imperatively demanded the abolition

of the purchase system as every question of Army reorgani
zation was tied to the pecuniary interests of its officers.
As long as purchase existed, an officer in the Regular Army
could not be transferred to a reserve unit as the auxiliary
forces were under the leadership.of non-purchase officers.
Neither could a purchase officer be forced to take a
commission of inferior rank in another regiment.

Hence,

Cardwell was denied any direct control of Army reorganization
as it was impossible to contract or expand Army units from
one regiment to another without creating new pecuniary
interests or interferring with those already existing.
4

Biddulph, pp. 98-99.
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Cardwell,

therefore,

regarded " . . .

the abolition of

purchase, not at the end but at the beginning of any
system of reorganization of the Army."

5

The actual origin of the purchase system is a
debatable issue as some historians point to 1627 when two
different rates were paid for military commissions,

as one

rate existed for civilians seeking initial commissions and
another for officers seeking higher rank.

Other historians

point to the Restoration period when non-military positions
were bought and sold.^

At any rate,

it is known that

Charles II recognized the system by Royal Warrant in 1683;
ten years later, William III abolished the system by the
same means.

7

It was revived again by Queen Anno, and

subsequently recognized as a legal institution in the
Ive vs. Ash decision of 1702.

O

^Har.sard's , CCVII, 10 59.
7

In the years that followed

6

Erickscn, p. 77.

The Annual Register: A Review of Public Events at
Home and Abroad, (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1758), CXIII, Pt. I, 69-70.
Hereafter cited as Annual
Register.
o
R. C. K. Ensor, England, 1870-1914, Vol. XIV of
The Oxford History of England, ed. G. N. Clark (14 vols.;
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936), 10.
Hereafter cited as
Ensor.
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the purchase system became an accepted institution.

During

the reign of George III, Parliament passed an act forbidding
the sale of government offices, but the Crown retained the
right to continue the sale of military commissions.^
In actual practice the purchase system developed out
of the Crown's prerogative to raise troops for the Army.
As Parliament imposed taxes for this purpose,

the Crown

used these funds to make contracts with certain individuals
for the purpose of raising a number of soldiers— usually a
regiment.

In return, these individuals were given command

of the regiment and allowed to nominate their own officers.
Since the financial terms of these contracts were seldom
sufficient to raise whole regiments,

the regimental com

manders made sub-contracts with their friends to raise
companies within the regiment.
regiment,

As the officers of the

these sub-contractors acquired rights.of property

in their commissions as they shouldered the major expense of
raising the regiment.

Later, when they wished to retire,

they were able to compensate for their expenditures by
selling their commissions to the highest b i d d e r s . ^

^Wheeler, p. 201; Morley,
^Erickson,

p. 77.

II, 361.
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Through the years the Crown and Parliament refined
the manner of obtaining■commissions until it became stabilized
in the following procedure.

Initially, an individual was

required to pass an examination which in essence proved that
he had the education of an aristocratic gentleman.^

After

receiving his first commission, advancement depended upon
seniority so long as the officer had the money to purchase
the next, commission above him.
were available,

Thus, if a major's commission

the senior captain in the regiment had the

initial opportunity to purchase it.

If he did not care to

purchase, or could not, the next senior officer could do so.
Commissions could be purchased through the rank of lieutenantcolonel, but higher ranks were never for sale.

12

These

positions, as well as all commissions vacated by death, were
filled On the basis of seniority,

13

Commonly applied the purchase system affected only
A

the Cavalry and Infantry regiments.

In the Royal Engineers

and Royal Artillery officers were required to have some
technical training, and promotion was based on merit alone.

~^Ibid.; "The Government Army Bill," Quarterly
Review, CXXX (January-April, 1871), 569.
1o

^Erickson, p. 77.

1 ^Wheeler, p. 201.
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Most purchase officers, however, were aristocrats by birth
and training, and they tended to ignore these technical
branches as beneath their dignity as gentlemen.
Although' a price scale for the sale of commissions
had been established in 1719,

15

and a ceiling for that

scale had been added by Royal Warrant in 1776,

16

it was

impossible to keep the system within prescribed regulations.
In selling their commissions most officers unlawfully
exceeded the scale limit by seeking whatever price they
could get.

The purpose behind these

payments was to induce

over-regulation

officers into an early

retirement,

thereby providing ambitious junior officers with more rapid
means of advancement.

17

Although the problem of over-regulation prices had
been investigated many times in the past,

18

Cardwell

appointed a new commission on April 5, 1870, to inquire

"^Erickson, p.

77; Woodward, p. 267.

■^Erickson, p.

77; Biddulph, p. 82.

Z- / "Report of the Commissioners appointed
to Inquire into Over-Regulation Payments on Promotion in
the Army, 11 XII (1070), 203.
17Ibid.. p. 211.

18Ibid., p. 203.

into the matter.

In its report this commission, under the

chairmanship of Sir George Grey, admitted that it was unable
to ascertain exactly when the practice of over-regulation
payments began but assumed that it existed from 1719, when
the regulation of commission prices was first established.

20

It pointed out that over-regulation payments had been pro
hibited by Royal Warrant until 1807, when a clause was inserted
into the Mutiny Act.

This clause prohibited the sale of

commissions by persons who acted as unauthorized Army agents
negotiating the purchase or sale of commissions.

Thereafter,

future changes in the regulation of commission prices were
>

.

■

made under this clause m

the Mutiny Act

21

until February 3,

1866, when regulation prices were again set by Royal
Warrant.

22

But in spite of statutory law and royal Warrants,

the Grey Commission reported that regulation prices were
generally exceeded throughout the Army. 2 3

■L9Ibid. , p. 202 .

2 0Ibid. t p # 209.

21

22

2

Ibid., p. 20 5.

3

Ibid., p. 201.

Ibid., p. 209.
Even though the actual over
regulation prices varied from regiment to regiment the
following scale of an infantry regiment is a good illus
tration of over-regulation payments.
The reader should
keep in mind that the officer who sold his commission to
purchase another paid only the difference in cost between
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The Grey Commission concluded its report by stating
that the practice of paying over-regulation prices was known
to exist by the government, but it was never formally
recognized; official knowledge of its existence was denied,
and regulation prices were hardly,

if ever, enforced. 2 4

In

fact, the Grey Commission found only two cases on record
where attempts were made to enforce regulation prices.

25

Much of the lack of enforcement was due to the fact that
the purchase of a military commission was handled in private
by an authorized Army agent, and the actual transaction.was
never recorded.

26

Since the purchase system was based, on monetary
interests,

it was open to many forms of abuse.

Most

aristocratic young men who entered the military service
to become officers had little aptitude for the profession,

the old commission and the new, plus the over-regulation
price.
Ibid., p. 210.

Ensign
Lieutenant
Captain
Major
Lieutenant-COlOnel

Regulation
.E450
E2 50
El,100
El,400
£1,300

24Ibid., p. 218.
2^Wheeler, p. 202.

Over-Regulation
E100
E600
E800
El,000
2 5Ibid., p. 219.

Total
E450
E3 50
El,700
E2,200
£2,300
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and they possessed little desire to make a study of it.

As.

Army officers they paid little attention to the technical
questions of military science and wasted most of their time
entertaining themselves with military reviews and parades.
.•
27
Using their wealth to gain prominence and prestige,
they
rapidly advanced over junior officers who were unable to
purchase higher rank, even under the .inducement of borrowing
funds at exorbitant rates of interest. 2 8

This led to great

incongruities in the length of Army service as certain
lieutenants might have served twice as long as some of the
captains.

29

In effect,

the purchase system prevented the

development of a professional standard among Army officers
as it bestowed security and high rank .upon incompetent
officers who were seldom denied the right of purchase.
In spite of all the self-evident weaknesses,
system had its vehement defenders.

30

the

Service opinion was

almost universally in favor of purchase as the Duke of

^Woodward,
28

p. 2 6 8 .

B. S.- P. , XII

(1870), 213.

29

Biddulph,

p. 77.

^Wheeler, p. 201.
The regimental commander had to
give his approval to the purchase, but since he was also a
product of the system his approval tended to be only a
formality.
Erickson, p. 77.
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Wellington extolled the virtues of the system in an 1833
memorandum.

31

Likewise/ in 1841, Lord Melbourne's Commission

praised the purchase system for furthering the promotion
and retirement of officers.

Similar military reports which

followed during the next thirty years were likewise confirmatory.

32

In these military reports most of the defending

arguments centered on the advantages which the purchase
system bestowed on the public.

For example,

it could not

be denied that under purchase Army officers avoided the
favoritism and interference of strong personalities which
was inevitable under a system of merit. 33

In addition,

the

defenders of the system argued that purchase considerably
lowered the cost of the Army Estimates as only a few
officers retired on full pay after thirty years service,
but the number was limited by a very moderate sum allowed
for the purpose in ;the Estimates.

Thus, the sale of an

officer's commission provided him with a retirement pension
which ordinarily would have been a public expense.

34

The

defenders of the system argued that by abolishing purchase

3 1 Hansard 1 s ,
3 3 Erickson,

CCIV, 1952.

p. 79.

3 2 Ensor,
34

p. 1 U .

Biddulph, pp. 93-94.
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the public would incur a great increase in the Army Estimates,
and it would witness lower-class men who had no connection
with the interests and fortunes of the country becoming high
military officers.
property,

As long as Army officers were .men of

they would serve the country for less and would

maintain the established order as their stake in society
tended to prevent them from lending support to revolutionary
a ctivities.^
With much of the public indifferent toward the
existence of purchase,

Cardwell realized that it would

be extremely difficult to terminate a system which had
deep roots in British society.

Such a task would encounter

almost insurmountable opposition from many quarters,
including among others,

Parliament,

Cambridge, and the Queen.

37

the Army, the Duke of

But in spite of the unfavorable

odds, Cardwell decided that an attempt had to be made for
it was futile to think of reorganizing the Army without
the abolition of purchase.

38

^ Hansard 1s , CCIV, 1438.
^"Purchase in the Army," CXXIV,
^Erickson,

p.

79

525.

.

^ L e t t e r s of Queen Victoria, II, 99.
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Early in 1870, Cardwell began his attack on the
system of purchase by proposing the abolition of the lowest
officer ranks— cornet in the Cavalry and ensign in the
Infantry.

39

Cardwell's predecessor at the War Office, Sir

John Pakington, ''originally initiated the proposal in 1868,
but left office before he could prepare a plan for pres
entation to Parliament.

As Pakington's successor, Cardwell

took it upon himself to complete this task by proposing
that every candidate for a first commission be made a
lieutenant at once, and that the government reimburse the
cost of purchasing the commission of lieutenant.

40

This

proposal was met with a dismal reception in the House of
Commons and was rejected on the grounds that no provision
was made for over-regulation prices.

41

Not to be discouraged by his initial defeat, Cardwell
spent the entire summer and autumn of 1870, preparing a plan
for the complete abolition of purchase.

Taking the advice

which Lord Grey had given in 1857, Cardwell informed Lord
Granville,

the Foreign Secretary,

Erickson, p. 80.

that he agreed with Grey's
40

.

Biddulph, p. 95.

^ Illustrated London News, March 19, 1870, p. 303.
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comment,

" ’it was better to let the Purchase System alone,

unless you were prepared to abolish it altogether.'"

42

Gladstone warned Cardwell to "'go slowly'" with "'this
enormous business,'" but by mid-October the plan was in
final f o r m . ^
Parliament and the public had little knowledge of
Cardwell's ambitious plan until February 16, 1871,

44

when

he surprised both the Army and the nation by inserting
into the Army Estimates an Army Regulation Bill, of which
the main provision was the abolition of purchase.

45

This

bill provided that Army officers would be compensated by
the government for their commissions according to the
market which existed for over-regulation prices on
January 1, 1 8 7 1 . While the Army Regulation Bill did
not include an estimate of the probable cost of abolishing
purchase,

the Report of Denham Robinson and Robert Davey,

42 Cardwell to Granville, November 1870, Granville
Papers, 30/29/68:84, as cited by Erickson, p. 80.
4^Glads tone Papers, 34: f. 157-160
Mss., 4119), as cited by Erickson, p. 80.
44
45
46

16.

The Times

(Br. M u s . Add.

(London), July 21, 1871, p. 9.

Wheeler, p. 20 3.
B. S_. P.., "Army Regulation of Forces Act," I (1871),
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which was made public at this same time, stated that if the
maximum number allowed for each rank to retire a year did so,
the total cost would amount to approximately £ 8 ,0 0 0 , 0 0 0
through 1896.

Purchase, however, Would not entirely

disappear until 1906-1907=

4.7

On February 16, 1871, in his speech introducing the
Army Estimates, Cardwell stated that the sole purpose behind
the Army Regulation Bill was to promote the amalgamation of
the Army and the auxiliary forces.

48

The key to the whole

bill was, of course, the abolition of purchase, but the bill
also contained two other major provisions.

The first removed

jurisdiction from the lord lieutenants of counties over the
appointment of officers in the auxiliary forces and gave
this authority to the Crown.

49

Future promotions for officers

in the auxiliary forces would hereafter be made on the basis
of merit, but the advice of the lord lieutenant of,the county
47

Ibid., "Report by Messrs. Robinson and Davey on the
Probable Cost of Abolishing Purchase in the Army," XXXIX
(1871), 677.
4^The Times

(London), July 21, 1871, p. 9.

49
' Hansard 1 S , CCVI, 65.
The lords lieutenants of
counties regained their connection with the auxiliary forces
In 1907, when Secretary of War Richard B. Haldane estab
lished the Territorial Force as part of his Army reorgani
zation scheme.
Omond, p. 12 4.

i
I
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■1
would be sought for all first commissions.

The second

provision gave power to the Secretary of War to lengthen
or shorten the period of enlistment service in the Regular
Army as he felt necessary under certain conditions from
time to time.

51

In addition to the major provisions of the

bill/ there were many other minor clauses which related
to them.

52
While the Army Regulation Bill was more than just

the abolition of purchase,
debate m

this became the sole issue of

the House of Commons.

53

On March

6

, 1871, Colonel

Loyd Lindsay opened discussions on the bill by declaring
that national defense did not justify an expenditure of
£8,000,000 for the extinction of purchase.

He argued that

it would destroy the regimental system which had successfully
won Britain's wars for two hundred years.

54

Lindsay's

efforts were supported by a group of extreme military
critics,

dubbed the "Parliamentary Colonels," who led the

5 °Biddulph,
c9

pp. 111-112.

See Appendix C, pp. 147-148.

5 ^11lustrated

5 1 Ibid.,
53

pp. 110-111.

Ensor, p. 10.

London News, March 11, 1871, p. 230.

77

fight to save the purchase system.

55

They argued the

abolition of purchase would stagnate promotion,

introduce

. .
56
favoritism,
and destroy 11. . . the Army which our Great
Duke has bequeathed us."

57

. Night after night the debates

raged; discussions became heated, arguments were repeated,
and many amendments were proposed.

58

So much ". . .

wrangle and jangle . . . accompanied every word of every
clause . . . "

59

one member of Parliament was forced to cry

out in disgust,

"Here we are, after a fortnight,

discussing one clause."

60

As a result,

still

Sir Roundell Palmer

accused the "Parliamentary Colonels" of ". . . endeavouring
to baffle the majority by mere consumption of time."

61

"^Ibid., February 25, 1871, p. 182.
This group
included not only Colonel Lindsay, but Captain Stanley,
Lord Mahon, Colonel Gilpin, Major Arbuthnot, General
Herbert, Captain Talbot, and others.
Ibid., March 11,
1871, p. 230.
^ Ibid. , March 11, 1871, p. 230.
^Wheeler-, p. 208.
5 8 Ibid.,

59
60

p. 204.

Illustrated London News, June 24, 1871, p. 622.
Hansard 1 s , CCV, 72.

^ Annual Register, CXIII,

Pt. I, 71.
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If, by chance, Cardwell heard Palmer's reference to
a majority favoring the abolition of purchase, no doubt he
wondered where it was hiding.

As if the opposition of the

"Parliamentary Colonels" and the Conservatives was not
serious enough, 62 Cardwell had to face considerable
resistence, from factions within his own party.

One group

of Liberals was insistent that the Ballot Bill be placed
first on the Ministry's legislative agenda for the 1871
session.

6

3

Both Gladstone and Cardwell, however,

refused

to accommodate this request as they knew that if the Ballot
Bill passed first,

this faction would desert the government

when it came time to pass the Army Regulation Bill.
addition to this faction,

In

some of Cardwell's fellow Cabinet

members opposed him as well.

Both Robert Lowe, Chancellor

of the Exchequer, and H. C. E. Childers, First Lord of the
Admiralty,

did not like the bill and refused to support it.

^McCarthy,

6'

IV, 567.

The Ballot Bill was designed to introduce a system
of secret voting at the polls.
It failed to pass in the
1871 session, but was passed the following session in 1872.
^Erickson,

p. 82.
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With few members of the government giving their full
support to the Army Regulation Bill,

the major burden of

defending the measure fell squarely on Cardwell's shoulders.^
Angered by the vicious attacks which the bill was receiving,
Cardwell presented an eloquent defense of the measure on
March 16, 1871.

After expressing his concurrence with the

eulogies that had been given in regard to the heroism and
gallantry which the British soldiers had displayed in' the
past under the system of purchase, Cardwell added that there
was a lesson to be learned from the late Franco-Prussian War.
He pointed out that much of the Prussian success in France
was largely due to the professional education and training
of its officers.

Similarly, Great Britain needed the

abolition of purchase if it was to increase the professional
efficiency of its officer corp as neither heroism o,r gal
lantry could compensate for professional training ". . .' in
these days when arms of precision shoot down soldiers at
.
„66
immense distances.

In answer to the charge that the abolition of purchase
would destroy the esprit de corps of the regimental system,
66
Biddulph, p. 115; Erickson, p. 81.
^ H a n s a r d 1 s , CCV, 135-136.

Cardwell bluntly stated that few of the regimental commanders
had actually risen through the ranks of the regiment they
. ' 67
were now commanding.

He added that if the regimental

system depended upon purchase then it must be- concluded
that neither the Royal Artillery,

the Royal Engineers, nor

the Royal Navy possessed the means for preserving order
and discipline in their branches of service as they were
not subject to purchase. 68

In his summation Cardwell

openly admitted that the bill was an attack on a class
interest which held a monopoly on commissions, but he
defended the abolition of purchase on the grounds that
it would create a true aristocracy .based on merit and
professional talent.

69

In spite of Cardwell's efforts to secure quick
passage

of the Army Regulation Bill, it was met

in committee

with so many dilatory motions and amendments that by June
it was no nearer passage than it was in March.
".

. .unparalleled

obstructions . . ."

67

Ibid., p. 142.

88

Ibid., pp. 146-147.

68

70

•

which

Due to
were

Ibid.

78Philip Guedalla, The Queen and M r . Gladstone (New
York: Doubleday, Doran and Company, Inc., 1934), p. 318.
Gladstone to Queen Victoria, June 10, 1871.
Hereafter
cited as Guedalla.

". . . without precedent in the present generation . . . .,"
Cardwell announced the government was dropping three parts
•

•

of the bill m
included:

an effort to secure its passage. 72

These

(1) the proposal to qive the Secretary of War

power to shorten or lengthen the period of enlistment
service,

(2 ) the proposal to enact compulsory military

service in the case of emergency, and (3) the proposal to
lend money to counties for building Militia barracks. 7 3
These clauses were of little importance to the bill in
comparison with the cardinal principle of the abolition
of purchase, but they did offer the opposition numerous
opportunities for inflicting further delays in its passage.
The abandonment of these three proposals lightened the bill
by half of its original thirty-four clauses and to carry
them all would probably have resulted in defeat for the
whole measure.

74

71

Ibid., p. 319.
June 14, 1871.

.
.
Gladstone to Queen Victoria,

^ Annual Register, CXIII,

Pt. I, 72.

^ Hansard 1s # CCVII, 1545-1546.
^Biddulph,

pp. 126-127.
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When the government dropped these proposals in the
second week of June,

the Conservative opposition screamed

that the Liberal Ministry had abandoned Army reorganization.
On June 12, 1871, Benjamin Disraeli,

the Conservative leader

in the House of Commons, protested against the fact that
Cardwell had introduced the Army Regulation Bill as an
attempt to reorganize the Army.

As the measure appeared now,

it was stripped of those proposals and nakedly stood before
the House of Commons as an abolition of purchase bill. 7 6
Cardwell denied this charge by stating:
. . . the other powers proposed to be conferred
by the Bill, thou 1 useful, are not absolutely
necessary
Furthermore, he argued that the reorganization of the Army
was :
. . . a matter for the Executive Government, and
as that Executive Government we cannot begin
organization until purchase has been abolished,
and until the powers of Lords Lieutenant of
counties have been t r a n s f e r r e d . 7 7
Resistence to the bill continued, but gradually
enough opposition gave way to secure its passage on

75Hansard 1s , CCVI,
*76Ibid. , p. 1906.

1907-1908.
77Ibid., pp. 1922-1923.
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July 3, 1871, by a fifty-eight vote majority.

Thus, after

four months of debate the House of Commons finally gave
its approval to the Army Regulation Bill.

7R

On July 4, 1871, the bill was brought from the
Commons and read for the first time in the House of
Lords.

79

Lord Northbrook, Cardwell's Under-Secretary,

opened the debate on the bill with a clear exposition of
the government's policy regarding it.

on

He denied that

the Ministry was without a plan for Army reorganization but
later stated that it had no place in the bill.

Like Cardwell,

he held Army reorganization to be a function of the Executive
Government,

not Parliament. 81

\

At the very outset of the debates in the House of
Lords it was apparent that the peers were in conflict with
the decision of the House of Commons
on a class issue."82

. . by class motives

Many of the members of the House of

Lords were heads of families who regarded the purchasing
of commissions as their own perquisite, and it was not

7 8 Ibid.,

R0

81

CCVII, 1073.

79

Ibid., p. 1077.

Annual Register, CXIII, Pt. I, 72-73.
Hansard's , CCVII, 1545.

82

Ensor, p. 12.

84
j

J
difficult to equate their own interests with that of
op
the nation.
Rather than overtly denounce the abolition of
purchase the peers decided to outflank the government by
a quick maneuver.

On July 13, 1871, the Duke of Richmond,

who led the Lords in opposition to the bill, moved that the
measure be tabled until the government offered a complete
scheme.for Army reorganization.

84

Four.days later/ on

July 17 this motion was passed by a vote of 155-130.

85

Thus, by appearing to demand more information the peers
cleverly tabled the bill without openly voting it down. 86
But blocking its passage amounted to nothing more than the
Qn

rejection of the bill.
A month before the House of Lords passed this
killing motion, Cardwell anticipated a postponement in the
passage of the bill.

He decided that an indefinite

deferment would considerably delay Army reorganization;
83

Erich Eyck, Glads tone, trans.' Bernard Miall
(London: Unwin Brothers Ltd., 1938), p. 209. Hereafter
cited as Eyck.
84

Hansard 1 s , CCVII, 1577-1581.
McCarthy,

85

Ibid., 1867.

IV, 568.

The Illustrated London News, July 22, 1871, p. 58.
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therefore,

on June 12, 1871, he stated in threatening

w ords:
We now have the power . . . to put an end to
purchase; but we do not see how /we can obtain/
the full compensation and security /for Army officers/
. . . without an alteration of the law . ^ 8
Although Cardwell did not reveal it then,

the power to

which he referred was the Royal Warrant.

He knew that

the purchase system existed on that basis alone, and if
need be, it could be abolished by the same means.

89

On July 18, the day after the Lords passed their
killing motion, Cardwell suggested to the Cabinet that the
action of the Lords made the use of the Royal prerogative
necessary, and the Cabinet gave its approval.

90

Since

Gladstone had informed the Queen of the possibility of
such action three days earlier,

she was willing to sign

the Royal Warrant on the formal request of the Cabinet.
After the Cabinet complied with this request,
88
89

91

the Queen

Hansard 1 s , CCVI, 1906.
McCarthy,

90

IV, 569.

Guedalla, p. 32 3.
July 18, 1871.
^Morley,

Gladstone to Queen Victoria,

II, 363; Wheeler, pp. 205-206.
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signed the Royal Warrant on July 20.

On the following

day this fait accompli was presented to Parliament . 9 2
Immediately,
by the opposition,

the government was vehemently denounced

including The Times

(London) which had

,

given the government strong support up until this point.

g -3

It was generally agreed that the action was legal, but
the

.point;, m

condemnation was the procedure. 94

After

first seeking the abolition of purchase by an act of
Parliament,
and it

the government failed to achieve its purpose

resorted to the Royal

95
prerogative.

No clever

argument could acquit the Ministry of this charge of
inconsistency. 96
While many a cry of "foul" went up in Parliament,
no vote of confidence was ever called over the sudden and
shocking use of the Royal Warrant.
however,

97

By the same token,

it cannot be said that the procedure made the

9^The Times
9^

95

(London), July 22, 1871, p. 7.

Ibid., July 21, 1871, p. 9.
Ibid.,p. 573.

94

McCarthy,

9 6 Eyck,

IV, 571-572.

p. 210.

97"The Coup D'Etat," •Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine,
CX (September, 1871), 365.

QQ

Ministry more popular. °

Perhaps the situation called for

a vote of confidence, but the reason why hone was called
can partially be explained by the course of events.

The

day after the government announced the Royal Warrant
abolishing the purchase system,

the Duke of Richmond was

forced to move that discussion of the matter be postponed
in the House of Lords until July 31, 1871. 99

As the patron

of the horse races at Goodwood which took place during the
fourth week in July,

the Duke of Richmond was prevented from

leading the antagonized feelings of the Lords for some ten
days.

When the peers met on July 31, the outraged emotions

in both houses of Parliament had subsided, and violent
action against the government failed to materialize.
effect,

in

the House of Lords had no choice but to unshelve

the Army Regulation Bill and pass it for without their
approval Army officers would be unable to receive the
QQ

J. L. Hammond and M. R. D. Foot, Gladstone and
Liberalism (London: English Universities Press, Ltd., 1952),
p. 119.
^^The Times

(London), July 22, 1871, p. 7.

100The Illustrated London Hews, July 29, 1871, p.

86

.

88

generous compensations which the bill provided for their
commissions.

101

■

After passing the bill the peers, still

angered by the government's procedure, added a censure
resolution which strongly condemned the. Ministry for
attempting ". . . to depricate and neutralize the independent action of the Legislature . 1 1 07
On October 30, 1871, the day before the Royal Warrant
abolishing purchase became effective, 10 3 a new Royal Warrant
was issued outlining a new system of promotion that was
based on the dual principles of seniority and merit.

The

lowest officer ranks of cornet and ensign were abolished,

104

and initial appointments for lieutenancies were made on the
basis of competitive physical and mental examinations.
Thereafter, promotions were based on one of two methods.
The regimental commanders or lieutenant colonels would be
obtained by selection based on merit, and all vacancies
below that rank would be filled by qualified senior officers.
But when an officer reached the rank of major-general,

^^Ensor,

p. 10; McCarthy,

IV, 570.

1Q2Annual Register, CXIII,

Pt. I, 78.

103See Appendix D, p. 149.

104

Biddulph, p. 141.

89

retired/ or died,

the vacancy would be filled on the

basis of selection.

This distinction was designed to

prevent officers from filling vacancies on the principle
of seniority by the voluntary acts of the officers them
selves.

Hence, officers could no longer make secret

bargains for advancement.

105

With the abolition of purchase an accomplished
fact, Cardwell's immediate problem was to put into effect
the provisions of the Army Regulation Bill which related
to the government's purchase of officer commissions.

This

task he turned over to a purchase commission which con
sisted of Edward Lugard, Charles Richard, Earl De La Warr,
and James Cornelius O'Dowd.l^b

Almost immediately, Army

officers echoed complaints against the commission for
unfair treatment.

Their dispute stemmed from the fact

that under the Army Regulation Bill each officer who
decided to sell his commission, yet remain in the Army,
was given what he would have received for it under the
purchase system.

In the future, however, he would have

10 5
Erickson, p. 84.
"^^.The Times

(London), October 4, 1871, p.

8

.

90

to earn his promotions and forfeit his retirement pay.
On the other hand, an officer who decided to leave the
Army would receive all the money he had invested in
commissions, but junior officers would find it more
profitable to stay in the Army, accept future retirement
benefits, and forfeit the smaller sums which he had paid
for commissions.

Purchase officers could not understand

why they had to forfeit any sum at all, and this' was the
grounds of complaint.
On January 30, 1872, Army officers made their
complaints public by circulating a petition in the House
of Commons.

Cardwell was irked by this action and made

note of it to the Duke of Cambridge who in turn sent out
a circular disapproving of the action of the officers.
This attempt to discredit the dissatisfied officers back
fired as they now petitioned the Duke.
widespread dissatisfaction,
into the matter.

Because of the

the Queen suggested an inquiry

Cardwell, however,

felt the purchase com

mission was doing its task admirably, but he reluctantly
informed the Queen that he would not object to the appointment
of an inquiry, 108 if it became necessary.

107Biddulph, pp. 144-145.

108Erickson, p. 84.
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In July 187 3, the. House of Lords demanded an inquiry
into the mounting officer complaints.

In reference to this

motion the Duke of Cambridge implied that officers had been
dealt with unjustly.

Therewith,

Cardwell became extremely

annoyed with the Duke for he knew that a few well-chosen
remarks from the Commander-in-Chief could have put a stop
to the agitation.

109

Nevertheless,

Cardwell agreed

to the appointment of a Royal Commission.

After exhaustive

studies the Royal Commission made its report in June 1874,
three months after Gladstone's Ministry had left office.
The report stated that the grievances of the officers were
not traceable to the Army Regulation Bill or to the purchase
commission but were due to conditions which were sometimes
inseparable from Army service under the purchase system.HO.
It admitted there were irregularities in the compensation
for officers' commissions, but it stated this was natural
when dealing with an extremely complex s u b j e c t . T h e
Royal Commission concluded its report by expressing the
hope that the discontent of the officers would gradually

109

Ibid.

^-^Ibid. , p. 148.

110

Biddulph, pp. 145-146.
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dissipate as the government was doing its best to administer
the purchase of commissions in a fair and proper manner.
Ultimately,

this hope was realized.

Gradually,

the

Army officers accepted their new circumstances, and even
tually,

the Army became far more attractive as the abolition

of purchase brought forth the development of a professional
standard for its officers.

113

The abolition of purchase was truly a remarkable
achievement for with it the Secretary of War gained full
responsibility for the organization and management of the Army
for the first time m

.
114
British History.

Undoubtedly,

the

abolition of purchase involved the expenditure Of a large sum
of money,- but it was necessary.

Without the abolition of

purchase the Army could never have been reorganized into the
efficient force which the nation needed.

115

Cardwell's accom

plishment was referred to by Gladstone in these glowing words:
. ... I venture to affirm that no man who ever
held the seals of office since the Secretaryship
at War was established has done so much for the
reform and efficiency of the Army . . . .

ll 2 Erickson, p. 84.
^Annual Register, CXIII,

113

Biddulph, p. 148.

Pt. I, 81.

^■^Wheeler, p. 209.
^~^^The Times

(London), October 30, 1871, p. 3.

CHAPTER V
REORGANIZING THE MILITARY FORCES

During the period between the Crimean War and
Cardwell's arrival at the War Office/ the structure of
the British military forces can best be described in the
words of an unknown Prussian officer,

"Your material is

excellent, but you have no o r g a n i z a t i o n . U n l i k e
Regular Army,

the

the auxiliary forces of Great Britain were

not subject to the Commander-in-Chief but were under the
direction of an Inspector-General of Reserve Forces, who
reported to the Secretary of War.

2

As a result,

the

auxiliary forces which consisted of the Militia, Yeomanry,
Volunteers, Enrolled Pensioners, and Army Reserves,
lacked a sense of unity and cohesion with the Regular
Army.

Contributing to this nebulous relationship was

the fact that during the long years of peace following

H a n s a r d ' s , CXCVI, 1519.
Biddulph, p. 22 6 . The Commander-in-Chief was given
control of the auxiliary forces with the passage of the War
Office Act in April 1870.
See above, pp. 56-57.
2
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94

the Napoleonic Wars the auxiliary forces had quickly
deteriorated m

size and quality. 3

Of all the auxiliary forces,

competent military

authorities had the least regard for the Yeomanry.
with antiquated firearms,

4

Armed

this reserve cavalry force

numbered 17,000 men in 1868.

It was required to drill

six days a year, but the actual drill was about as irregular
as the target practice.

5

The Volunteer Force numbered approximately 360,000
men in 1814, but it practically ceased to exist during the
long European peace which followed after Waterloo.
1859, however,

In

this force was reestablished by a roused

British populace who feared a French invasion as a result
of the Orsini plot to assassinate the French Emperor
Napoleon III.

Even though the government provided little

guidance and direction for the Volunteers,
3
Erickson, p. 85.

4

7

this force, by

Biddulph, p. 5.

c:
Erickson, p. 85.
6 "Military Forces," CXXXIII, 210.
^"Inefficiency of the British Army," CXXIX,

519-520.
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1868, developed into the nation's third line of defense
behind the Regular Army and the Militia.

g

The backbone of the British auxiliary forces was
the Militia as it served two purposes:

first,

it provided

trained replacements for deficiencies within the ranks
of the Regular Army; and second,
defense for the home front.

it presented a line of

These two objectives, however,

were somewhat contradictory as the Militia could hardly
provide adequate home defense with raw recruits if it
continued to supply large numbers of trained men for the
Regular Army.

9

Thus, serious thought was given to solving

this dilemma by creating the Army's own reserve force.
The first move toward creating a specific reserve
for the Regular Army came in 1843, when Parliament
authorized the Crown to enroll a force of 10,000 men who
were on military pensions.
of rural police,

Since Britain lacked a system

the primary objective of this enrollment

was to create a military unit which could aid civil
authorities in controlling possible disturbances among
the populace.

As a secondary objective,

^Army Book, p. 43.

the Crown was

^Hansard's , CXCVI, 1508-1509.
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given authority to use the services of these men in the
event of a national w a r . ^
In 1859, Secretary of War Sidney Herbert instituted
the first real Army Reserve through an act which gave the
Crown authority to create a force of 20,000 men who had
at least five y e a r s ' service in the Regular Army.
under the Reserve Force Act of 1867,

Later,

the Reserve of 1859

ft

and the Enrolled Pensioners were established as the Second
Class Reserve.

The Reserve Force Act of 1867 also created

a First Class Reserve which was limited to 20,000 m e n . ^
The result of these measures, up to December 1868, was
highly unsatisfactory as there were only 13,068 men in
the Enrolled Pensioners, 2,847 in the Reserve of 1859,
and 2,033 in the First Class Reserve of 1867.

12

Barring the way to the formation of an adequate
..
13
Army Reserve was the system of long-term enlistment.
After 182 9, under the peacetime conditions which followed
Waterloo,
years.

servicemen enlisted for a period of twenty-one

In 1847, the length of enlistment was lowered to

^^Army Book, pp. 49-50.
12

Ibid., p. 50.

~^Ibid.
1 3 Wheeler,

p. 215.
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ten years, but in 1867,

it was raised to twelve, and

reengagements for nine years were encouraged to complete
the twenty-one years required for pension.

With every

soldier in the Infantry required to serve over half of
their enlistment period abroad, which was usually in
India or the tropics,

the men were simply too old and

too exhausted to participate in military exercises once
they were discharged from the Regular Army. 15

Thus, under

this long-service system it was impossible to establish a
reserve of trained men in ^the prime of life which could
be used to reinforce the Regular Army in a national
emergency.16
Shortly after Cardwell became head of the War Office
in late 1868, he discovered that the Reserve Force Act of
1867 was failing to supply the necessary reserves which the
country so desperately needed.

Due to the lack of adequate

pay and the undue proportion of foreign service in the
Regular Army, very few men joined the Army Reserves, and

~^ A r m y Book, pp. 53-54.

^Ensor,

p. 13.

16"Qn the Limitation of Enlistment and Army Reserves,
Blackwood 1 s .Edinburgh Magazine, CV.I (September, 1869), 2 84.

its ranks were far from full.

_L/

'As a result, on March 11,

1869, Cardwell announced to the House of Commons that he
felt it was necessary to reduce the period of foreign
service in order to establish an adequate Army Reserve.
To facilitate the reduction of enlistment service abroad,
Cardwell began to withdraw troops from the self-governing
colonies,

to disband colonial regiments created and main

tained by Imperial Estimates, and to encourage the formation
of colonial forces for their own defense. 18
As Secretary of War, Cardwell believed that Great
Britain needed only a small peacetime Army, but it was
imperative that her Army Reserves be large in order to
I

:

provide the Regular Army with easy expansion on the out
break of war.

Cardwell felt that the creation of a large

Army Reserve necessitated the establishment of a shorter
period of enlistment.

As he explained to the House of

Commons on June 10, 1869,

this would enable men to become

part of the Army Reserve while they still possessed the
vigor of youth.

19

Comparatively speaking, he pointed out

"*^Biddulph, p.

68

.

^ S e e above, pp.

•^Hansard 1s , CXCVI, 1535-1536.

39-40.
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that France required only a five year enlistment;
the enlistment was no longer than three years.

in Prussia

In the case

of Prussia, however, Cardwell admitted circumstances were
somewhat different as Prussia utilized conscription to fill
its Army Ranks while Great Britain depended upon attraction
and voluntary enlistment.

In addition, he explained that

Prussia had no large Army stationed abroad whereas Britain's
Army was spread around the world.

20

-

Much discussion was given to the establishment of an
adequate Army Reserve during the 1869 session of Parliament,
but no definite plan was adopted.

As a result, Cardwell

prepared a scheme which he presented to Parliament on
March 3, 1870, in the form of an Army Enlistment Bill.
Cardwell explained that the bill' would maintain the period
of enlistment service at twelve years, but the men would
serve not more than six, nor less than three years,
Regular Army at the option of the Secretary of War.

in the
The

balance of six or nine years would be spent as a civilian
in the Army Reserve with the liability of recall to the
Regular Army whenever necessity demanded it.

20

Ibid., p. 1543.

^^Hansard‘s , CXCIX, 1175-1176.

21

Later/

in

100

May when the bill was being debated, Cardwell informed the
House that:
The object of the Bill is to have a Reserve
Force . . . trained in the Army, by the Army,
and for the Army, and constituting in the
moment of emergency a Reserve upon which the
Army may rely.22
While the Army Enlistment Bill was before the House
of Commons,

the Franco-Prussian War was in progress on the

continent.

Many members of Parliament felt Britain was

t

unprepared for war and had no business adopting a measure
that would promote further military unpreparedness.

They

advocated that the bill be dropped and urged the adoption
of universal conscription in order to obtain more men for
the Army.

Cardwell, however,

could not be convinced that

a definite need for conscription existed, and he refused
to drop the bill.

23

Resistance to the bill continued

through most of the summer of 1870, but in late July the
House of Commons finally passed the measure? the House of
Lords did likewise in early August.

22

83-88,

Ibid., CCI, 788.

9A

23

With the Queen’s

Erickson, p. 87.

^ Hansard 1s , CC1II, 1516.
See Ei. S^. J?. , I (1870),
for the complete Army Enlistment Bill.
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Royal assent,

Britain possessed a new system of short-

service based on voluntary enlistment.
The passage of the Army Enlistment Act was an
•A

important milestone in the history of Great Britain as the
Prussian victory over the Austrian s a t Sadowa proved that a
soldier of short-term enlistment was fast becoming the
most formidable of all-Europe.

25

Not only did the act

provide for the creation cf a large Reserve force of
60,000 men,

but the adoption of short-service established

a more voluntary system of recruitment.

Previously the

Army establishment held the notion that any man would do
for the.service, no matter how bad his character,

since

he could be easily kept in line by a system of severe
discipline.

Naturally,

the presence of common criminals

in the ranks of the Army tended to deter many respectable
men from enlisting.

This made it necessary to induce men

to enlist by giving them a bounty upon joining the service
ranks.

This practice not only encouraged enlistments, but

it also encouraged desertions and fraudulent reenlistments
to obtain new bounties.

In order to prevent this practice

25Morley, II, 359.

26B. S.. P. , I (1870), 85.

a soldier who was convicted of desertion by court-martial
might be sentenced to a severe flogging and/or to an
indelible marking with the letter D — if guilty of bad
conduct he was marked with the letters BC.

Cardwell

realized that the subjection of soldiers to flogging and
marking tended to prevent men of good character from
joining the Army; therefore,

in 1869, Cardwell abolished

flogging under peacetime conditions,

27

and the following

year he completely abolished marking also. 2 8

In June 1870,

Cardwell abolished the payment of bounty for enlistments
and compensated soldiers for the abolished bounties by
giving monetary rewards to those who completed two years
of good conduct.

29

Two months later in August 1870, with

the passage of the Army Enlistment Act, Cardwell introduced
a new policy of discharging men of. bad character from
Army service. 30
As a result of Cardwell's efforts to obtain a more
voluntary system of enlistment,

the Army became far more

2 7Flogging was not altogether abolished until 1881.
Army Book, p . 26, n . 3.
28

Biddulph, pp. 208-209.

30 Biddulph, p.

ix

.

29

B. S. P., XIV (1870), 188.
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popular than it had ever been before as it was now open to
a new class of men.

Twelve months after the introduction

of short-service, the number of recruits totaled 23,000
which was nearly double what it had been during the last
year

(1869) of short-service.

31

In addition,

the number

of enlistees who deserted before joining their regiments
.dropped from 5,000 in 1859 to 800 in 1872.

32

Having insured the development of an adequate Army
Reserve through the Army Enlistment Act, Cardwell faced the
problem of organizing the various auxiliary forces In such
a manner that they would all work together with the Regular
Army in a national emergency.

In April 1869, he had taken

a vital step in this direction by securing the passage of
a bill which permitted the Militia, Volunteers, and Yeomanry
to train with the Regular Army.

33

But in spite of this

achievement Cardwell desired something more.

He wanted:

. . . to weld and consolidate every branch of
the service— -the Regular Army, the Militia, the
Volunteers, and the Reserve Forces that they may

■^Arthur, p. 71; Biddulph, pp. 211-212.
^ B . S_. _P. , "Report on Recruiting for the Regular
Army," XVIII (1873), 27.
33Erickson, p. 86.
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be animated by one spirit and directed by one
purpose, and constitute together the great
defensive force of our country.34
Consequently,

on February

6

, 1871, Cardwell presented to

the House of Commons a bill "For the Better Regulation of
the Regular and Auxiliary Land Forces of the Crown."

This

bill called for an increase of 45,000 men in the Militia, and
it also made provision for improving the quality of the
Militia by extending the training period and requiring an
annual drill.

In addition, arrangements were made to

organize training camps in a manner which would not hinder
the flow of men from the Army to the Reserves.

35

Cardwell,

however, was unable to gain the passage of this bill as he
was largely concerned with the abolition of the purchase
system during the spring and summer of 1871.

36

Having abolished the purchase system with the passage
of the Army Regulation Bill in late July,

37

Cardwell returned

his attention toward the reorganization of the military
forces during the autumn of 1871.

3 4 Hansard 1s_.
3 ^Wheeler,

CXCVI, 1539.

p. 217.

Using the initial reports

3 5 Erickson,

pp. 87-88.

3^See above, pp. 82-83.
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of General P. L. MacDougall's Commission on Military
Organization 3 8 and the memorandum of the Duke of Cambridge
on the same subject,

39

Cardwell prepared a scheme for the

localization of the military forces.
On February 22, 1872, Cardwell presented the House
of Commons with his localization scheme for consolidating
the military forces into one harmonious body.

He explained

to the members of Parliament that by localization of the
forces he meant:
. . . identification with a locality for the
purposes of recruiting, of training, of
connecting the Reserves with those who are
actually under the standards.^
Cardwell believed that this scheme would attract men from
classes who formerly did not wish to join the Army, associate
the Army with family ties and kindred,

induce men from the

Militia to join the Army, and destroy the recruiting
. .
41
competition between the Army and the Militia.
The essential idea of the localization scheme called
for the organization of all the Infantry forces into military
38

]3. S. _P. , "Report of the Commissioners on Army
Organization," XVIII (1873), 1-23.
39 Ibid. , "Memorandum of the Commander-m-Chief
•
•
on
Localization," XXXVII (1872), 385-399.
40

Hansard 1s , CCIX, 895.

41 ‘.
Ibid.
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districts, of which there would be sixty-six in Great
Britain and Ireland.

Each territorial district would

contain two battalions of Army Infantry,

two Militia

battalions, and a certain quota of Volunteers, Enrolled
Pensioners, and Army Reserves.

42

A depot center would

be established at the hub of each district where the
supplies and headquarters for the troops of that district
would be located.

At this district command headquarters,

the Infantry and Militia battalions would receive their
training, and as a general rule all the recruits for both
forces would be obtained within the confines of the
district.

43

In each of the sixty-six districts one of the

Regular Army battalions would always be stationed abroad
and the other at home.

The object of this arrangement

was to have the home battalion supply men and equipment
for the twin battalion serving abroad.
therefore,

In each home district,

an Army battalion and two Militia battalions

would always be ready for activation on a war-time footing.
This arrangement would greatly facilitate mobilization of
the country's entire military forces and would place them
in battle readiness at short notice.

^ Ibid. , p. 896.
44Ibid.. pp. 897-898.

44

43Ibid.. pp. 896-897.
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Although Cardwell described the localization scheme
only as it applied to the Infantry, he also had similar
plans for the Royal Artillery.

Like the Infantry the

nation would be sub-divided into districts, but in this
instance there would be twelve districts in comparison
with sixty-six for the Infantry.

Each Artillery district

would contain the Royal Artillery plus the Artillery of the
Militia, Volunteers, and Army R e s e r v e s . ^

Later,

this

organization would prove to have less success than the
localization of the Infantry regiments because of the
continued maintenance of the Royal Artillery as a single
regiment.

But during his remaining years at the War Office,

Cardwell tried to compensate for this shortcoming by
increasing the total of horse-drawn guns in the Royal
Artillery from 180 to 336, and by adding about 5,000 men
to its ranks;
Cardwell made no mention of his plans for the Cavalry"
in his speech on the localization of the forces, but as it
later developed,

the Cavalry forces were divided into two

districts with the same organization as the Infantry and

45Biddulph, p. 173.

^6Ensor, p. 15.
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the Royal Artillery.

47

As with the Royal Artillery,

this

scheme was met with less, success than the localization of
the Infantry due to the social entrenchment of its officers.
Again Cardwell compensated for this arrangement by increasing
the strength of the Cavalry from 8,762 to 10,422 m e n . ^
In contrast with most of Cardwell's previous legis
lation, his localization of the forces scheme was received
by both sides of the House of Commons with a .general chorus
of approval.

Cardwell was praised for having constructed

a plan which when perfected would -form the foundation upon
which a sound military organization might be erected.
Even the specific details of the plan were not harshly
criticized,

though some members of Parliament strongly

advised that each pair of regiments should be fused together.
This sound advice, however, was not .acted upon until 1881,
when the officers and men of the linked battalions were
amalgamated into one regimental corps.

50

After Parliament gave its approval to the localization
scheme,

Cardwell proposed the Military Forces Localization

47B_ S_. P., XVIII
4^Wood, p. 32 8.
5QIbid., p. 178

(1873), 1.
4^Biddulph, p. 177.

10 9

(Expenses) Bill to effectuate the plan.

In the bill, Cardwell

asked Parliament for the appropriation of 113,500,000 to pur
chase land on which the depot training centers could.be
established and also to construct barrack housing on those
centers.

51

The localization scheme was not, however,

the

sole reason for the need of buildings as additional housing
was also required for the Militia.

In addition,

the with

drawal of Army troops from abroad created the imperative
need for additional barrack construction at home.

52

Even though Parliament heartily approved of the
localization scheme,

serious opposition developed over the

bill designed to put it into effect.

The arguments against

the appropriation measure were many and varied.

Some members

of Parliament argued that the. expense was too great; some
felt that localization would eventually turn Great Britain
into a military state; others thought the depot centers
would become focal points for immorality and vice throughout the nation.

53

During the violent debates on the bill,

51

R. S_. _P. , "Military Forces Localization (Expenses)
Bill," III (1872), 217.
Of the sixty-six depot centers,
forty of the old stations were to.be reconverted, and
twenty-six new stations were to be constructed.
^^Biddulph, pp. 182-183.

^Erickson,

p. 89.

110

Gladstone remained silent on the matter as it was his custom
to let his ministers carry their own bills.

In this

instance, however, Cardwell became annoyed by Gladstone's
silence.

He informed Gladstone that the opposition would

cease " 'if they clearly understood from you that the Bill
is part of the Army policy of Government,
.
54
is indispensable.'"

and that . . .

With this urging Gladstone rose to

defend the bill and did so with great skill.

As a- result,

shortly before the session ended, 55 on August 10, 1872,
the measure was passed. 56
Like most of Cardwell's reforms the localization
scheme was not entirely new.

Even Cardwell admitted this

and attributed the principle on which it was established
to William Pitt

(the younger) who stated in 1803:

'The Army must be the rallying point.
The Army
must furnish example, must afford instruction,
must give us the principles on which the national
system of defence must be formed, and by which
the . . . /auxiliary/ forces of this country,
though in a military view inferior to the regular
army, would, fighting on their own soil . . . ,
be invincible.'5 7

■^Cardwell to Gladstone, July 22, 1872, Gladstone
Papers, 35: f/ 40-41 (Br. M u s . Add. MSS., 44120), as
cited by Erickson, p. 89.
55Erickson, p. 89.
57 , . t
Ibid.

it

56Hansard's, CCXIV, 866.
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Cardwell was not the first to propose the linked battalion
system either, for in 182 5, Lord Palmerston attempted to
create such a system.

This attempt failed because strategic

defense demanded that .a greater proportion of regiments be
kept abroad rather than at home.

58

Cardwell's success in

linking the battalions resulted because the need for
garrisoning troops all over the world no longer existed.
With the development of the steamship, Cardwell was allowed
the liberty to concentrate British forces at home as modern
steamships could quickly transport British troops to any
threatened point. 59

This fact changed the concepts of

defending British interests abroad, and Cardwell capitalized
on it.

Admittedly,

the ideas on which the new British Army

were established were not entirely Cardwell's, but the fact
remains he gave them new meaning by making them a reality..

58Arthur,

p. 70.

59Omond, pp. 109-110.

CHAPTER VI
/
MEN, MATERIEL, AND MOBILIZATION

In spite of administrative and organizational
reforms, Cardwell realized that Britain's military system
would fail to show much improvement if the Army continued
to rely on the weaponry and combat skills required in the
past.

Admittedly, a modern military system needed both

an administration and an organization which were highly
efficient, but in and of themselves they did not con
stitute an army.

Cardwell knew that without the most

modern weapons and systematic training,

the bravest and

best administered soldiers were doomed to defeat.

During

his tenure at the War Office, Cardwell was constantly
aware of this fact and continually sought to improve the
officers, weaponry, and combat readiness of Britain's
fighting forces.
Prior to the abolition of purchase in 1871, the
British Army was weakened by the mediocrity of its officers
as few opportunities were provided for their instruction
112

113

in the art of warfare.'*'

Holding firm to his belief that no

officer should be allowed to command men in combat unless
possessed with the ability and knowledge for such a command,
Cardwell took necessary steps to improve the military
education of Britain's Army officers.

2

Previous to his

arrival at the War Office, a Royal Commission had been
appointed in 1868 to study the state of military education
in the Army.

After nearly two years of gathering ‘information,

it presented its report to Parliament on February 1, 1870.

3

In this report the Royal Commission advised that a DirectorGeneral of Military Education be established to facilitate
a badly needed program of officer education.

Given this

advice, Cardwell abolished the inactive Council of Military
Education on. March 31, 1870, and created the office of the
Director-Gerteral of Military Education. 4
this new department,

Acting through

Cardwell established military schools

for Army officers at various military posts .throughout the

^B. s. P.. , "First Report by the Director-General of
Military Education,"XVIII (1873), 63.

n
^Letters of Queen Victoria, II, 90.
^Hansard 1s , CC, 1553.
§.• R- r XVIII (1873), 49.
Cardwell appointed
William Napier as the first Director-General of Military
Education.
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country.

5

. . .
Beginning instruction on September 1, 1870,

these schools offered courses in military, law,

6

field

fortifications, military sketching, and reconnaissance.
In conjunction with these schools reference libraries were
also established to encourage individual study of military
8
subjects.

In addition to recommending the establishment of a
Department of Military Education,

the Royal Commission

advised that the Army require of its officer candidates
nothing more than the ordinary liberal education of the
country.

9

.
.
.
Using this principle as its guide-lme,

the Royal

Commission further recommended that in the competitive
examinations for new officers the government place a
greater reliance on the classical subjects and depress
the modern languages and s ciences.^

In making this

recommendation the Royal Commission argued that "cramming"
for the entrance exams could be prevented as it was of the

^Ibid., p . 63.
^Letters of Queen Victoria, II, 90.
7 B.

9

IS. P., XVIII

(1873), 63.

Hansard 1s , CC, 1576.

8

10

Ibid. , p.. 64.
Ibid., p. 1561.
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opinion the sciences could more easily be committed to
memory than classical knowledge. 11
'Many members of Parliament reacted to this advice
by voicing their immediate protest’against Lhe Royal
Commission for suggesting that"...
■

'

our officers . . .

sleep on antique Greek and Roman beds.
a ringing tone to their argument,

..."

12

Adding

these members exclaimed

with astonishment that classical knowledge was certainly
not the emphasis'in Prussia.

In answer to this charge

the Royal Commission admitted a higher standard of
scientific knowledge did exist in the Prussian Army, but
it explained this was due to the fact that science largely composed the general educatiorf^of the country;
Britain this was n o t •the case.

in Great

If Britain wished to apply

a remedy then it should do so in its schools and universities
before it demanded higher requirements for scientific
knowledge in the officer entrance examinations.

Remaining

convinced that the Army must follow the country, not lead
it as in the case of Prussia,

the Royal Commission stood

its g r o u n d . ^

lll h ± d ., p. 1565.
13Ibid.,

p. 1576.

1 2 I b i d . , p.

1567.
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Seeking to encourage Britain's best educated young
men to enter the Army, Cardwell assumed a moderate position
in the wake of this controversy.

Rather than disparaging

the sciences for the purpose of raising the classics or vice
versa, Cardwell thought it best to seek a varied education
in the officer entrance exams.

Viewing the Army as a

microcosm of the nation, Cardwell maintained that the
military service ought to contain every excellence which
the country could produce.

14

Keeping this' objective m

mmd,

Cardwell instructed the Director-General of Military Education
to draw up a detailed scheme of military education in which
stricter examinations would be required for commissions.
As a result, entrance examinations were constructed around
a liberal program of education rather than emphasizing the
sciences or the classics.

Knowledge of subjects such as

Hindustani, geometry, and drawing was no longer required,
but at the same time, knowledge of the French and German
languages was made mandatory.

In addition to the stricter

entrance examinations, promotions in rank were made dependent
upon similar exams which indicated high mental and physical
.
15
proficiency.

14Ibid., p. 1579.

15 Erickson, p. 93.
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Ever since the Austro-Prussian War, British
authorities recognized that much of Prussia's military
success was due to her custom of assembling a large number
of troops under conditions which closely resembled w a r .
Divided into two opposing armies,

these maneuvers were of

special value to the Prussian Army as they implemented
classroom knowledge through the practical instruction of
troops,

staff, and commanding officers. 16

As a-means of

implementing military education in a similar manner,
Cardwell decided to institute annual maneuvers in the
British Army.

In adopting this Prussian practice, Cardwell

was again departing from tradition as Britain had held only
one Army maneuver between Waterloo and the Crimean War, and
it involved only

10,000

men..

17

Early in 1871, Cardwell secured the passage of an
act which provided for the assembling of troops that coming
autumn in Berkshire and parts of Hampshire and Surrey
counties.

Precautions were taken to prevent unnecessary

damage to property, and a' court of arbitration was established,.

^ Army Book, p. 46.
17 Erickson, p. 90.
Training on a large scale was
largely neglected during this period because the Army was
dispersed throughout England and Ireland in small police
units.
Woodward ■, p. 2 6 8 .
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to assess the unavoidable damages caused by the operation . 1 8
On July 31, 1871, shortly before the maneuvers were planned
to begin,

the whole operation was called off as it was

decided to hold a similar but smaller operation between
Chobham and Aldershot.

When asked about this change of

plans, Cardwell replied that a late harvest was expected in
the Berkshire area, and the farmers' horses, which were
needed for Army transport., would still be in use.

This

excuse was highly inadequate, and the press promptly issued
a barrage of criticism.

In rebuttal Cardwell stated that

the War Council had investigated the Berkshire region and
discovered it was not a suitable location for holding
maneuvers due to the following reasons:

the region lacked

proper fencing; its impure water made it a typhoid area; and
its clay soil would make it difficult for the troops to
maneuver if it rained during the operation.

Poor as these

arguments were, Cardwell knew the real reason for canceling
the large maneuvers at Berkshire was due to the fact that
the Control Department was not equal to the task.

Cardwell,

however, would not publicly admit this fact because such

^Erickson,

p. 90; Biddulph, p. 189.
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action would have merely redirected the criticism to Henry
Storks,

the head of that department. 1 9
With the large maneuvers at Berkshire having been

canceled, a smaller maneuver was held around Aldershot
during the first part of September.
real fiasco.

It proved to be a

The whole operation was indicative of its

start as the horses of the first Life Guards stampeded.
Throughout the maneuver the officers remained similarly
spirited, but they lacked a definite knowledge of procedure.
As a result, orders for the next morning1s activities were
never issued the night before;

therefore,

the troops were

left almost totally ignorant of what was going on.

Making

matters worse, much of the equipment was obsolete, and
this resulted in frequent breakdowns.

20

In addition,

the

troops made numerous complaints about their daily meat
rations as the Cattle Contagious Diseases Act required that
all animals be slaughtered in London.

Instead of having

the animals sent along with the troops in flocks and herds,
the meat was sent out daily from London to the troops by

^Erickson,

p. 90.

^ 8 Ibid.

120

train.

But by the time the meat passed through the various

depots and commissaries,

the troops received their rations

late at night or not at all.

21

Despite the many shortcomings of the maneuver,

the

operation proved valuable as it revealed precisely where
improvements were needed.

22

Realizing that no one individual

could be blamed for the failure, Cardwell criticized no one.
Instead, he attributed the disappointing results to a general
lack of. experience in holding military maneuvers.

In the

future, however, he hoped the Army would rectify its mistakes
.

2

and prevent them from recurring.
The following year

3

(1872) Army maneuvers were held

on a much larger scale in the counties of Wiltshire and
Dorset.

24

.
Many foreign observers from various continental

armies were invited to attend this assemblage of troops
which was considerably larger than the British force that
21

Ibid.; "Autumnal Manoeuvres," Blackwood 1s Edinburgh
Magazine, CXI (March, 1872), 325.
Hereafter cited as
"Autumnal Manoeuvres,"
^Erickson,

p. 90;

"Autumnal Manoeuvres," CXI,

Erickson, pp. 90-91.
24

Biddulph,

p. 189; Erickson, p. 91.

323.
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landed m

the Crimea in 1854. 2 S

Luckily,

these maneuvers

went off much more successfully than the previous year, and
all Army departments, with the exception of the Control
Department,

exhibited considerable improvement.

26

As

usual the Control Department performed its duties badly.
For example, men who were familiar only with the issuance
of medical supplies and utensils were suddenly placed in
charge of purchasing hay and oats for the Cavalry horses.
Together with various other mismanaged arrangements,

27

it was

no wonder the system of transport and supply broke down.
Maneuvers were held once again in the autumn of
187 3, but since the Duke of Cambridge felt that it was
unwise to assemble the entire force each year,

three smaller

operations were held at Dartmoor, Cannock Chase, and
Curragh. 2 8

In each instance the officers and men performed

their duties well, but once again the Control Department
proved unequal to the task.

25

Biddulph, p. 189.

This time, however,

26

the reasons

Erickson, p. 91.

2 7"Qur Autumn Manoeuvres," Blackwood1s Edinburgh
Magazine, CXII (November, 1872), 639.
2^Erickson, p. 91; Biddulph, p. .190.
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for its breakdown were obvious.

The department was simply

being overworked as it lacked sufficient men and equipment
to perform its functions properly.

In addition,

its tasks

were made more difficult by the officers and men of the
combat troops who consistently failed to give the department
their full cooperation.

29

Since Cardwell prepared the Army Estimates for the
last time in 1874, he arranged to have maneuvers held
during the coming autumn.

After 1874, however, maneuvers

were not held again until 1898.

30

Regretably,

this was a

great mistake for while the annual maneuvers were held
the officers and troops gained training and experience
which could be acquired in no other way short of war.
addition,

In

the annual maneuvers were important because they

brought public attention to the military forces.

The

nation saw that it could field an Army of 100,000 men
and still have a small but steadily growing Reserve Force
to back it up.

Correspondingly,

the public realized that

the Militia was better prepared to fight along side the

2^Erickson, p.. 91.
30

Ibid.; Biddulph, p. 190, n. 1.
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Regular Army, and that the Volunteers were better trained
and more reliable for home defense.

As The Times

(London)

put it:
These are facts which the country ought distinctly
to appreciate, and if the Autumn Manoeuvres did
nothing else but bring them prominently forward,
the exertions of Mr. Cardwell and of the officers
who have so ably carried his views into effect
would be well repaid.
Up until the Austro-Prussian War, the Infantry of the
British Army relied on the Enfield rifle which was first
used successfully during the latter part of the Crimean
War. 32

This muzzle-loading weapon was highly regarded by

the military authorities until the outbreak of the SchleswigHolstein War when it was discovered the Prussian breech
loader could fire three rounds for every round fired by
the Enfield. 33

•
■
Frightened by this report British military

authorities appointed a committee in 1864 to investigate
and report on the practicability of adopting a breech-loading

•^The Times

(London), September 13, 1873, p. 9.

3 2 E. G. B. Reynolds, The Lee-Enfield Rifle (London:
Herbert Jenkins, 1960), p. 17.
Hereafter cited as Reynolds.

^"Inefficiency of the British Armyy" CXXIX,

520.

12.4

rifle for use m

the British Army.

34

After the committee

reached a favorable decision, an exhaustive testing program
was established at the Woolwich Arsenal where some fifty
different breech-loading systems were closely examined.

35

While the British were conducting their exhaustive
trials at Woolwich,
continent.

the Austro-Prussian War erupted on the

The overwhelming effect of the breech-loader in

the hands of the Prussian Infantry forced Britain to speed
the adoption of a similar arm for its own use.
as a temporary expedient,

36

In 1867,

the British adopted a breech-

loading system submitted by an American, Jacob Snider,

37

because it allowed for the conversion of the muzzle-loading
Enfields into breech-loading Sniders.

Hence,

the official

name for the new arm was the Snider-Enfield rifle, and it
had the distinction of becoming the first breech-loader
adopted for use in the British Army.

38

^Reynolds, p. 18.
It is interesting to note that
shortly before the death of Prince Albert in 1861, the
Queen's husband had unsuccessfully urged Lord Palmerston
to seek the adoption of a breech-loading weapon for the
Army.
Ensor, p. 14.
3 5 Reynolds,

p. 19.

■^Reynolds, p. 19.

36

Biddulph, pp. 36-37.

38Ibid., p. 20.
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/

Since the Snider rifle was adopted only as a stopgap measure, a new committee was appointed in late 1867
to inquire into the possibility of adopting a weapon
superior to the Snider conversion system.

After considering

many possibilities the committee recommended for trial a
weapon embodying a breech action invented by Frederich
Von Martini of Switzerland and a barrel designed by
Alexander Henry of Edinburgh.

39

Before the Martini-Henry

rifle could be officially adopted, however,

it was necessary

to test it under varying conditions and different climates.
As a result,
home,

m

some of these rifles were issued for trial at

India, and m
Meanwhile,

Canada.

40

on becoming Secretary of War in December

1868, Cardwell discovered the Regular Army was only partially
equipped with the breech-loading Snider-Enfield, while the
Militia and Volunteers were, still using the old muzzle41
loading Enfields.
Early in 1869, Cardwell took necessary
<3

steps to speed up the gradual arming of the Regular Army and
the auxiliary forces with the Snider-Enfield rifle.

3

^ Ibid..

^Biddulph,

^ " T h e Government Army Bill," CXXX,
^Biddulph,

p. 36.

42

When

pp. 36-37.

560.
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the Franco-Prussian War broke out in 1870, sixty-five
regiments of Militia and fifteen of Yeomanry had been so
armed.

Cardwell, however, wanted all the military units

equipped with these weapons, and the issuance continued
until May 1871, when the task was finally completed.

43

In presenting the Army Estimates on March 11, 1869,
Cardwell informed the House of Commons that he had been
urged by competent authorities to substitute the MartiniHenry rifle for the Snider-Enfield.

Cardwell noted that

this advice could not be realized at the moment since the
Martini-Henry rifle had not yet undergone all of its
extensive testing.

44

It was not until two years later

that prolonged examination proved the worthiness of the
Martini-Henry rifle, and in April 1871,
adopted for use in the British Army.

45

it was officially
This weapon was by

far superior to the Snider-Enfield, and between 1871 and
1874 the British Army was issued its first satisfactory
46
breech-loader.

^ Ibid, , p. 69.

4 4 Hansard,s ,

“^Reynolds,

4

p. 21.

CXCIV, 1134.

^Ensor, p. 14.
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In the final analysis Cardwell knew that the quality
of the British Army depended not upon its administration,
organization,

officers, or weaponry as much as it did upon

the welfare of the common soldier.

Through the Army

Enlistment Act of 1870, which has been examined previously,
Cardwell improved conditions in the service for the common
soldier by shortening the length of enlistment, by abolishing
barbarous punishments, and by discharging -men of bad
character.

47

While these reforms vastly improved the

quality and quantity of recruits,

the men still did not

enlist in sufficient numbers as the unskilled laborer
earned somewhat higher wages than the ordinary soldier.
Since this especially tended to prevent men from joining
the military service during prosperous times, Cardwell
insisted on increasing the wages of the troops.

After

overcoming some opposition, he secured the adoption of
an increased pay scale m

1873.

48

^ Prior to the wage increase each soldier received
Is.

3 d.

per day which included Id. per day for beer money.

The net pay of each soldier, however, was only 10%d. per

47See above,

pp. 101-102.

48Erickson, pp. 92-93.

day as the ration stoppage fee of 4^d. was deducted for his
bread and meat rations.

Since these monetary fractions

complicated Army accounting on payday and were a general
nuisance, Cardwell' abolished the ration stoppage and
increased each soldier's wages to an even Is. per day.
At the same time he arranged to have this pay scale
adopted for the Militia also.
increase,

The Times

49

As a result of this wage

(London) commented that the Infantry

soldier would be one of the best paid unskilled laborers
in the country as each soldier would receive food, lodging,
clothing,

education, and medical care plus Is. per day. 50

Supplementing the wage increase, Cardwell saw to it
that the soldiers received many other extra benefits.

He

increased the allowances of men on furlough and made
arrangements to give honorably discharged.soldiers employ
ment preferences in the civil services,
police force, and in the Post Office.

in the metropolitan
In addition, Cardwell

provided separate quarters for married soldiers and ordered
that all barracks be repaired.

49

IIansard,s , CCXIV,

50The Times

Recognizing that much of

876.

(London), February 25, 1873, p. 9.

Army life involved "organized idleness," Cardwell directed
commanding officers to arrange with the Royal Engineers
and the Control Department that all barrack repairs be made
by military labor whenever possible.

In the process of

making needed repairs the soldiers were not only paid for
their work, but they were also taiught various trades which
would be of help to them once they were discharged from
military service.

51

As a result of the foregoing improvements,

together

with Cardwell's organizational and administrative reforms,
the British Army was better prepared for a national war
in 1874 than it had been in 1868.

During the nearly six

years in which Cardwell reformed and reorganized the Army,
he was very fortunate that no large-scale war erupted.

In

his last year at the War Office, however, one small colonial
war involving the Ashantee tribe on the Gold Coast of West
Africa did occur.

Due to the British embargo on slave

trade and the British control of the Gold Coast port cities,
the slave-trading Ashantees were annoyed because the British
were menacing their chief source of wealth.
61

.

Erickson, p. 93.

Failing to
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obtain the chief port of Elmina by negotiation,

the Ashantees

invaded the British protectorate early in 1873,

in an effort

to acquire a slave emporium. 52
At first, opinion in Gladstone's Cabinet was badly
divided over.what action it should take.
however,

On the insistence,

of the Colonial Secretary, Lord Kimberley, and

Cardwell,

the Cabinet decided to send an expedition against

the Ashantees.

53

Sir Garnet Wolseley was placed in command

of this expedition,

and suffice it to say that after landing

on the Gold Coast in October 1873,

the expedition was brought

to a successful conclusion five months later.

Ironically,

the news of the successful expedition did not reach Britain
until after Gladstone's Ministry had fallen from power as
a result of the Liberal defeat at the polls in the general
elections of February 1874.
It might be said,

54

therefore,

that Cardwell's last

act as Secretary of War was to make an effective use of the
Army which he had so diligently reformed and reorganized. 5 5

52

Ibid. , p. 94.

^Biddulph,

53

Ibid.

p. 223; Erickson, pp. 94-95.

^^Biddulph, p. 223.
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On the day-before he left the War Office Cardwell wrote to
Lord Northbrook referring to the Ashantee Expedition in
these w o rds:
'Precision had anticipated everything that could.be
desired, and if it were to be done over again,
.. . . nothing different ,/could be suggested/.
How
was this accomplished? Not by any knowledge on my
part of such affairs, but by the simple fact . . .
/of/ having an admirably organized office. . .
In terms of efficiency the Ashantee War of 1873-1874 proved
that Cardwell's work was not in vain for a larger but
similar campaign in Abyssinia in 1868 had cost £8,600,000
while the Ashantee Expedition had cost only £900,000. 5 7
To be

sure, the Ashantee Expedition was only a small-scale

war against

savages, but it must be remembered that it was

performed in an area where no European troops had previously
served.

Had not an efficient Army organization been in

existence,

the expedition might have entailed greater cost,
i
ro

or possibly it might have ended in disaster.

56Ibid., p. 224.
-^Biddulph,

22 5.

“^Wheeler,

p. 221.

CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION

Unlike many of his fellow Liberals,

Cardwell was

elected to the House of Commons in the general elections
of February 1874.^

Shortly thereafter, he was elevate'd to

the House of Lords as Viscount Cardwell of Ellerbeck.

2

During the next few years Lord Cardwell continued to
participate in public affairs within the calmer atmosphere
of his peerage, but never again did he become a minister
of state.

•3

Cardwell's years at the War Office placed a heavy
burden upon his health,
his secretaryship,

and after he stepped down from

it rapidly deteriorated.

By 1879, he

was quite ill and rarely attended the House of Lords.

A'

year later Cardwell went to Montfleury, France to rest and
recuperate.
and by

His health, however,

continued to deteriorate,

1883, he no longer had normal use

of his once

^Erickson,

p. 99.

^ Ibid. ; D.

N. B_. , III,

3 D.

III, 953.

4 Erickson,

p. 99.

N. R. ,
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953.
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brilliant mind for a large part of the time.

From Montfleury,
i
r

he was taken to Cannes, and from there to Torquay, England,
where he died on February 15, 1886. 6
As a political figure in nineteenth century Britain,
Cardwell's importance largely rests on his performance at
the War Office.
1868,

When he became Secretary of War late in

the Army establishment existed largely unchanged since

the days of the Stuarts.
inefficient;

Its administration was'highly

its organization was archaic; its officers

lacked technical and professional skills; and, its conditions
of service Were barely tolerable for the common soldier.
During his administration at the War Office Cardwell managed
to reorganize the administration of the Army, abolish the
systems of dual control and the purchase of commissions,
introduce the system of short-service,

improve the con

ditions of military service, and adopt the principle of
localization for the Army and Reserve units.

,As a result,

when Cardwell departed the War Office early in 1874, Great

^Ibid., p.

100

.

°Ibid. y D. N. B^. , III, 953.
Upon his death Cardwell's
peerage became extinct for his marriage to Annie, the
youngest daughter of Charles Stuart Parker of Fairlie,
Ayrshire, in 1838, was not blessed with children.
D. N. 13. ,
III, 953.

Britain possessed a modernized Army that was larger than
any previous peacetime force in British History.

Yet for

all his efforts Cardwell left the Army Estimates at a
lower figure than when he assumed office in 1868.

7

On Cardwell's departure from the War Office many
members of the Conservative Party urged that his successor,
Gathorne-Hardy,

drastically alter the essential- parts of

the Cardwell reforms.

Recognizing that the Cardwellian

system met the momentary needs of the British people both
at home and abroad,

Gathorne-Hardy, as well as his successors,

refused to make significant changes in it. 8
of this fitting tribute,

As the recipient

the Cardwellian system contributed

significantly to the good fighting record of the British
troops in the overseas colonies during the last quarter
of the nineteenth century.

But due to the fact that

Cardwell’s successors accepted the Cardwellian system
without adding necessary alterations to meet changing needs,
the eventual breakdown of the Cardwellian system became
inevitable.

As Cardwell left it, the British Army was a

well-organized fighting machine; nevertheless,

7See Appendix E, p. 150.

there was

8Erickson, pp. 99-100.

room for further reform.

In a period when continental armies

were introducing General Staffs to handle the complex
problems of military administration,

Cardwell’s successors

allowed the Duke of Cambridge to remain as Commander-inChief until his retirement in 1895.

Eventually,

the

combined effect of the Duke's presence in the office of
the Commander-in-Chief together with the lack of a General
Staff yielded humiliating results during the Boer War in
South Africa.
With the conclusion of the Boer War, the opening
years of the twentieth century brought forth a new era of
military reform in Great Britain.

These years saw the

creation of an Imperial General Staff,

the improvement

of the territorial system, and the construction of the
British Expeditionary Force.
overdue, but nevertheless,

These reforms were long

on the eve of World War I the

British military system still rested on the principles
which Cardwell had introduced.

Short-service.still

supplied men for the Army Reserve; localization still
associated the regiments with territorial districts; and,
the fighting units at home were still balanced with those

serving garrison duty abroad.

9

Thus, Cardwell's reforms

were of such magnitude that he can be called the father of
the modern British Army.
As .an able Victorian administrator Cardwell ranks as
one of the greatest military reformers in British history.
Unlike Scharnhorst, his Prussian counterpart during the
early nineteenth century, Cardwell did not achieve his reforms
with the impetus of military defeat such as the Prussians .
received after Jena.

Unquestionably,

the impact of Prussian

militarism served to weaken the old Army order in Britain, and
Cardwell's cause was thereby given indirect aid.

Nevertheless,

his reforms were viewed with suspicion by many and staunchly
opposed by the Queen, by the Duke of Cambridge, by the Army
establishment, by the Conservative Party, and by many members
within his own Liberal Party.

Due to this almost insurmount

able opposition, Army reform might never have been achieved
between 1868 and 1874 without Cardwell’s indomitable courage,
perseverance,

tact, and pressure.

To be sure, Great Britain

was served more brilliantly by other men of his generation,
but none served their country more faithfully, more strenu
ously, or with more lasting results.
9

.
For details of Army reform during this period see,
John K. Dunlop, The Development of the British Army, 18991914 (London: Methuen, 1938).

APPENDIXES

APPENDIX A

MEMORANDUM SHOWING THE CHANGES WHICH HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN
THE ORGANIZATION OF THE WAR O F F I C E 'BETWEEN 1854 AND 18691

Prior to the year 1854, the different Departments
connected with the Army, Militia, and Volunteer forces,
were as follow:—
(1) Two Secretaries of State for War and Colonies and
Home.
(2) General Commanding-in-Chief.
(-3) Ordnance Office.
Master-General of the Ordnance.
Clerk of the Ordnance
Surveyor-General of the Ordnance.
Principal Storekeeper.
Inspector-General of Fortifications.
Director-General of Artillery.
(4) Treasury (Commissariat).
(5) Secretary at War.
(6) Army Medical Department.
(7) Audit Office.
(8) Commissioners of Chelsea Hospital.
(9) Board of General Officers.
(10) Paymaster-General.
On 12th June, 1854, a fourth Secretary of State was
established for the Department of War, and on the 11th
August, 1854, an Order in Council was passed providing the
necessary Establishment for carrying on the duties of the
Office.

^"Cited verbatim from Clode, The Mi 1 itary Forces of
the Crown, II, 769-776.
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On the 14th November, 1854, another Order in Council
was passed, adding a second permanent Under-Secretary of
State for the War Department.
The other Military Departments still existed separately,
but the Secretary of State for War assumed and exercised
control over all of them.
In December, 1854, the Commissariat was transferred
from the Treasury to the War Department, including the
Banking business connected with the Treasury Chest, as well
as the business hitherto performed by the Audit Office of
the examination of the Commissariat Cash and Store Accounts.
In January, 1855, a Topographical Department was
formed under a Director.
In February, 1855, the office of Secretary at War
was combined with that of Secretary of State— the Secretary
of State for War receiving, in addition to his Patent as
Secretary of State, a Commission as Secretary at War.
In March, 1855, the Business connected with the
Militia was transferred from the Home Office to the War
Department.
Om the 18th May, 1855, the Business connected with
the Militia was transferred from the Home Office to the
War Department.
On the 18th May, 1855, a Patent was granted to the
Secretary of State for War, vesting in him the administration
of the Army and Ordnance, "except so far as relates to and
concerns the Military Command and discipline thereof shall
have been committed to, vested in, or regulated by the
Commander-in-Chief;" and on the 25th May the Secretary of
State transferred the Command and discipline of the Ordnance
Corps to the General Commanding-in-Chief, who was thus placed
in command of the whole Army.
An act (18 & 19 Vic., cap. 117)
was also passed, vesting in the Secretary of State all the
estates and powers formerly held and exercised by the Board
of Ordnance.
On the 6th June, 1855, an Order in Council was passed,
settling the future constitution of the Civil Departments
of the Army as follow;—
(1) Clerk of the Ordnance.
(2) Inspector-General of Fortifications.
(3) Director-General of Artillery.
(4) Director-General of Naval Artillery.
(5) Director-General of Stores.
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(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)

Director— General of
Director-General of
Accountant General;
Superintendents for
Departments.

Contracts.
Clothing.
and
each of the Manufacturing

These Officers were in addition to those included in
the Establishments of the War Department, War Office, etc.
In January, 1856, a Committee was appointed by the
then Secretary of State (Lord Panmure) to consider and
recommend a definite distribution of the duties of the
Officers consolidated under the
Secretary of State for
War,
and of the several classes of Clerks, so as by an
uniform scale of renumeration to render them available
for any branch of the^ War Department.
The recommendations of the Committee, which reported
on the 3rd January, 1856, were agreed to by the Treasury,
and the consolidation of the several branches of the War
Department was then completed.
This consolidated Department thus .included the duties
of the Secretary of State's Office the Militia business of
the Home Office, the War Office, the Ordnance Office,
Commissariat and Medical Departments, the examination of
the Cash and Store Accounts of the Commissariat Department,
the examination of the payments made by the PaymasterGeneral for non-effective Services, and the duties of the
Board of General Officers relating to Clothing.
The Commissioners of Chelsea Hospital still retained
the duty of placing soldiers on the Out-pension List,
though the expenditure of both In and Out pensions was
borne on the Army Estimates.
On the 2nd February, 1857, another Order in Council
was passed (revoking the Orders of the 11th August and
14th November, 1854, and 6th June, 185 5), by which the
following alterations were effected in the Superior appoint
ments of the Office.
(1) One Under-Secretary of State reduced.
(2) One Clerk of the Ordnance abolished.
(3) One Director-General of Clothing reduced.
(4) One Principal Clerk discontinued.
The Naval Director-General of Artillery was appointed
Director of Stores, continuing to perform the duties of the
former Office.
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And the following Offices were created:—
(1) One Assistant Under-Secretary of State.
(2) One Secretary for Military correspondence.
(3) The Office of Deputy Secretary at War Was merged
into that of Under-Secretary of State.
In July, the Topographical Department, the Military
Depot of the Quartermaster-General's Office, and the
Ordnance Survey, hitherto a branch of the InspectorGeneral of Fortifications' Office, were placed under an
Officer of the Royal Engineers as a Director immediately
responsible to the Secretary of State.
In September, the Banking business connected with
the Treasury Chest was re-transferred to the Treasury.
In October, the Office of Examiner of Army Accounts
was abolished, and a Senior Clerk, under the title of
Assistant Accountant-General, was appointed to perform
the duties. In 1857 the business connected with the Army Schools
was taken from the Chaplain-General and entrusted t6 a
Military Officer— Inspector-General of Schools.
A Board
of Military Officers, called the Council of Military
Education, was also established on the 1st of June in this
year for conducting the examination of Officers, and placed
under the control of the General Commanding-in-Chief.
In the same year, upon the gradual disembodiment of
the Militia after the Russian War, a Military Officer, to
act under the Secretary of State, was appointed as Inspector
of Militia.
In April, 1858, the Treasury appointed a Committee
to enquire into the duties of the Account Branch of the
War Office.
The main recommendation of the Committee was.
the transfer of the preparation of the Estimates of the
Accountant-General.
Owing to a change in the Government,
nothing was done to carry out this recommendation.
In May, 1859, the following alterations in the
organization of the War Office were decided upon:—
1. Transfer to the General Commanding-in-Chief of the
purely Military duties of the Inspector-General
of Fortifications and Director-General of Artillery,
and the abolition of the latter office.
2. Formation of a permanent Defence Committee.
3. Reconstruction of the Ordnance Select Committee.
4. Transfer of the management of Regimental Schools
and Libraries to the Council of Military Education,
the abolition of the appointment of InspectorGeneral of Schools.
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The Inspector-General o f 'Fortifications still remained
the Official Adviser to the Secretary of State on all questions
relating to fortifications and other works, and was also
charged with, the execution of those works; he was also a
member of the permanent Defence Committee; but he was wholly
relieved of.his Military duties as Commandant of the Corps
of Royal Engineers.
The Ordnance Select Committee was re-constructed, and
the President of the Committee took charge of that portion
of the duties of the Director-General of Artillery which
still remained in the War Office.
In November, 1859, the Treasury appointed a new
Committee to enquire into the duties of the Account Branch;
and in June, 1860, the Committee made a first Report,
repeating the recommendation of the Committee of 1858, in
regard to the transfer of the Estimates to the AccountantGeneral, and further recommending the separation of the
Account Branch from the General Office in respect of
establishment and promotion.
The appointment of an additional Assistant AccountantGeneral was also recommended, who should be charged with the
preparation of the Estimates and the Bookkeeping Branch.
These recommendations were carried into effect in
August, 1860.
The Volunteer Force having so largely increased in
1859, and a Military Officer being required to superintend
the organization and discipline of the Force, an InspectorGeneral, with a deputy, was appointed in January, 1860, ■
and placed in charge of the Civil business of the Force.
In March, the transfer of the superintendence of
Army Schools and Libraries to the Council of Military
Education under the control of the General Commandingin-Chief was carried out, and the appointment of InspectorGeneral of Schools abolished.
In November, a Librarian and Precis-writer was
appointed.
In December, the Inspector of Militia was placed in
charge of the Civil business of the Militia in the War
Office, and the designation of the appointment was altered
to that of Inspector-General.
In January, 1861, a recommendation, founded on the
report of the Select Committee on Military Organization,
was referred to the Treasury for the appointment of a
Director of Ordnance, who would relieve the President of
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the Ordnance Select Committee of that portion of his duties
as Adviser to the Secretary of State on Artillery and
Armaments, and also be placed in charge of the whole of
the Manufacturing Departments.
At the same time the Secretary of State expressed his
intention of appointing at some future date a Director of
Supplies, who would be charged with the supply and issue of
all stores (not being munitions of War).
In accordance with
this proposal a Director of Ordnance was appointed in
July, 1861.
In May, the Secretary for Military Correspondence
(Major-General. Sir E. Lugard) was appointed Under-Secretary
of State, the former appointment being abolished.
About the same time a Military Officer, on half-pay
and receiving Staff-pay, was appointed to assist' the Under
secretary of State.
In November, the Assistant Under-Secretary of State
died and his appointment was not filled up.
In December, a Military Officer was appointed to
assist the Director of Ordnance, and styled Assistant
Director of Ordnance.
In February, 1862, a Committee which had been appointed
to inquire into the Establishments of the several branches
of the War Office, fixed the number and classification of
the Clerks to be in future borne on those Establishments,
exclusive of the Account Department and Solicitors' Branch.
In May, the Office of Assistant Under-Secretary of
State was revived, and Captain Galton, appointed thereto,
the third Under-Secretary of State being at the same time
abolished.
In June, the Barrack Department was transferred from
the control of the Inspector-General of Fortifications, and
was formed into a separate branch under an Engineer Officer
as Superintendent.
In September, the designation of the InspectorGeneral of Fortifications was altered into Inspector-General
of Engineers and Director of Works; in the former capacity
he was reinstated in the command.of the Corps of Royal
Engineers and placed in immediate communication with the
Commander-in-Chief; in the latter he was under the direct
control of the Secretary of State for War.
The Office of
Deputy Inspector-General of Fortifications was abolished.
Two Deputy Directors of Works, one for Barracks
and the other for Fortifications and Civil; Buildings, were
created.
(These Officers of the Royal Engineers had
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previously held similar appointments under the InspectorGeneral of Fortifications.)
In June, the Clothing business was separated from
the Store Department, and on 2 3rd February, 1863, was made
into a distinct branch under a Director of Clothing.
In May, 1863, an Act was passed abolishing the Office *
of Secretary at War, and vesting in the Secretary of State
the duties and powers of that office.
In June, 1864, another Committee was proposed to the
Treasury for the purpose of inquiring into the Establish
ment of the War Office.
The reports of this Committee
commenced in September, 1864, and continued from time to
time until May, 1865.
Their recommendations resulted in the following
important, changes: —
1. The separation of the department, which had been
previously under the sole control of the AccountantGeneral, into two branches.
One under the AccountantGeneral, the other under the Chief Auditor of Army
Accounts, an office for the first time created.
The
latter Officer took over a portion of the duties
hitherto performed by the Accountant-General and
his two assistants; also the Audit of Barrack,
Store, and Kit accounts from the Barrack and
Clothing branches; and eventually (1866) the
audit of the Store Accounts from the Store
Branch.
2. Of the two Assistant Accountants General, one was
abolished on the appointment of the Chief Auditor;
the other is to be abolished when a vacancy occurs.
3. The abolition of the appointment of Librarian and
Precis-writer.
4. The substitution of Out-Station Clerks of the Royal
Engineer Department in place of War Office Clerks
in the office of the Director of Works.
5. The substitution of Barrack Officers and Military
Clerks in the place of War Office Clerks in the
Barrack branch.
6 . The separation of the Clerical Establishment of
the Army Medical Department and Clothing Branch
from the rest of the War Office on distinct and
lower scales of pay.
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7. The withdrawal from the Commissariat of the Clerks
on the Establishment of the War Office, and the
substitution of Commissariat Officers and Staff.
8 . The introduction into the Chief Auditor's Branch
and Clothing Department of Military and pensioned
Non-commissioned Officer Clerks.
9. The formation of a Regulation Branch, with a view
to the codification of the regulations.
In August, 1866, it was decided, in consequence of
the great and important changes in Naval Ordnance, to appoint
an officer of the rank of Rear-Admiral, to be attached to
the Admiralty and to Act as Director-General of Naval
Ordnance.
In December, 1867, in consequence of the recommendation
of a Committee, presided over by Lord Strathnairn, appointed
in June, 1866, to consider the question of Army Transports,
but subsequently directed by General Peel to extend its
inquiries into the administration of the Supply Department
of the Army, a Military Office was appointed as Controllerin-Chief, to supervise and direct the various Departments
of Transport, Commissariat, Store, Purveyor, and Barrack.
Another Military Officer was appointed (temporarily) as
his assistant.
In April, 1868, a Royal Warrant gave effect to this
arrangement.
In consequence of this change, the appointments of
Director of Stores and Superintendent of the Barrack
Department were abolished in December, 1868.
In January, 1868, "with a view of increasing the
efficiency of the local Military Forces, and also of
securing unity of action in the event of their being at
any time required for Service," an Inspector-General of
Reserve Forces was appointed to supervise the Militia,
Yeomanry, Volunteers, and Enrolled Pensioners.
In November, a Director-General of Ordnance was
appointed in place of the Director of Ordnance.
A Deputy
was appointed at the same time.
The Ordnance Select Committee was abolished, and a
smaller Committee, styled the Artillery Committee, pre
sided over by the Deputy Director-General of Ordnance,
was appointed in its place.
The Director-General of Ordnance was also made
Commandant of the Arsenal at Woolwich, and the heads of
the various Manufacturing Departments were placed under
his orders.

APPENDIX B

SECRETARIES OF STATE FOR WAR BETWEEN 1855 AND 19001

Term
February 8, 1855
February 27, 1858
June 19, 1859
July 22, 1861
April 28, 1863
February 16, 1866
July 6, 1866
March 8, 1867
December 9, 1868
February 21, 1874
April 2, 1878
April 28, 1880
December 16, 1882
June 24, 1884
January 4, 1887
August 18, 1892
July 4, 1895October, 1900

Office-Holder
Lord Panmure
Jonathan Peel
Sidney Herbert
George Cornewall Lewis
G. F. S. Robinson
Spencer Compton Cavendish
Jonathan Peel
John Pakington
Edward Cardwell
Gathorne-Hardy
Frederick Arthur Stanley
Hugh Culling Eardley Childers
Spencer Compton Cavendish
William Henry Smith
Edward Stanhope
Henry Campbell-Bannerman
Henry Charles Keith Petty-FitzMaurice

■**F. Maurice Powicke and F. B. Fryde, Handbook of
British Chronology (2nd ed.; London: Offices of the Royal
Historical Society, 1961), p. 121.
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APPENDIX C

THE ARMY REGULATIONS ACT— ARRANGEMENT OF CLAUSES1

Part I.

Commissions in Her Majesty's Forces.
1. Abolition of purchase after November 1, 1871.
2. Compensation to officers holding saleable
commissions.
3. Compensation to officers of certain Indian
regiments.
4.
Provision for expense of compensating officers.

Part II.

Army Enlistment
5. Enlistment rules.

Part III.

Auxiliary Forces
6 . Jurisdiction of lieutenants of counties re
vested in Her Majesty.
7. Number of auxiliary forces.
8 . Voluntary enlistment in the Militia under
ordinary circumstances.
9. Training for Militia*
10. Increase of Militia in case of emergency by
voluntary enlistment, or, if necessary by
ballot.
11. Liability to serve in case of ballot.
12. Classification for purposes of the Militia.
13. Engagement in Volunteers to qualify for
exemption from the ballot.
14. Application of Mutiny Act to Volunteers
when in training.

Part IV.

As to Sale of Commissions
15. Appointment of Commissioners to compensate
officers.
16. Appointment of clerks by Commissioners.

1B. S. P. , I (1871), 11-13
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17.
18.

Powers and duties of Commissioners.
Decision of Commissioners to be conclusive.

As to the Ballot
19. Mode of balloting for the Militia.
20. Provisions to give effect to the ballot.
21. Definition ofcounties and division
of counties.
22. Definition of justices of division, session,
and clerks of division.
23.
Mode of ascertaining population for purposes
of the ballot.
Rules by Secretary of State for War
24.
Power to make rules.
2 5. Determine how returns in Militia to be made.
Part V.

Miscellaneous
26.
Power of Government to take possession of
the railroads in an emergency.
27.
Power of county or municipal boroughs to
build barracks.
28.
Incorporation of certain clauses of the
General Acts.
29. Loan by Public Works Loan Commissioners.
30. Payment by Secretary of War for use of
barracks.
31. Power of militia and volunteer corps to
acquire land for any necessary purposes.
Penalties and Saving Clauses
32.
Recovery of penalties.
33.
Provision as to Quakers.
34Saving of General Acts.

APPENDIX D

THE ROYAL WARRANT ABOLISHING PURCHASE IN THE ARMY1

Whereas by the Act passed in the Session held in the
fifth and sixth years of the reign of King Edward VI, chapter
16, intitled "Against Buying and Selling of Offices," and
the Act passed in the forty-ninth year of George III, chapter
126, intitled "An Act for the Prevention of the Sale and
Brokerage of Offices," all officers in our forces are pro
hibited from selling or bargaining for the sale of any money
for the exchange of any such commission, under the penalty
of forfeiture of their commissions, and of being cashiered,
and of diverse other penalties; but the last-mentioned.Act
exempts from the penalties of the said Acts purchase, or
sales, or exchange of any commissions in our forces for such
prices as may be regulated and fixed by any regulation made
or to be made by us in that behalf.
And whereas we think it expedient to put an end to
all such regulations, and to all sales and purchases, and
all exchanges for money of commissions in our. forces, and
all dealings relating to such sales, purchases or exchanges.
Now, our will and.pleasure is that on and after the
1st day of November in this present year all regulations
made by us or any of our Royal predecessors, or any officers
acting under our authority, regulating or fixing the prices
at which any commissions in our forces may be purchased, sold
or exchanged or in any way authorizing the purchase, or sale,
or exchange for money of any such commissions, shall be
cancelled and determined.
Given at our Court at Osborne, this 20th day of July,
in the thirty-fifth year of our reign.
By her Majesty's
command.
Edward Cardwell

1The Illustrated London News, July 29, 1871, p. 95.
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APPENDIX E

TABLE OF ARMY ESTIMATES1

Year____________ _____________Net Amount
1868-1869

£13,331,000

1869-1870

£12,047,600

1870-1871

£12,661,765

1871-1872

£14,422,732

1872-1873

£13,582,000

1873-1874

£13,231,400

1Hansard1s , CXCIV, 1111? B. S. P., XXXVII
B. S_. P., XL (1873), 3.
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